State of California

BIOTERRORISM SURVEILLANCE & EPIDEMIOLOGIC RESPONSE PLAN

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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES

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California Department of Health Services Bioterrorism Surveillance and Epidemiologic Response Plan

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I. Introduction and Background

Bioterrorism and its potential for mass destruction have been subjects of increasing concern. Terrorist groups have used or threatened to use biological agents in a variety of circumstances, both domestically and internationally. Current concerns regarding the threat of bioterrorism result from the production of biological weapons for use in the 1991 Gulf War and from the increasing number of countries that are engaged in the proliferation of such weapons. As many as ten countries possess offensive biological weapons programs and the existence of these programs increases the likelihood that biological expertise will be transferred, directly or indirectly, to groups and individuals with grievances against the government or society.

The growth of religious cults and extremist political groups also increases the threat of bioterrorism today. In 1995, a Japanese doomsday cult released the nerve agent sarin in a Tokyo subway following several failed bioterrorist attacks in Japan. The group had also planned similar attacks in the United States (U.S.). The most significant biological attack in the U.S. was the intentional contamination of restaurant salad bars with *Salmonella* by a religious cult in Oregon in 1984.

California is vulnerable to bioterrorist incidents. California has the largest population and the largest economy in the nation and continues to be a major port of entry for travelers to the U.S. One in every eight Americans lives in California and two-thirds of the population lives in the coastal urban areas surrounding the San Francisco and Los Angeles metropolitan areas. California is the home to numerous extremist groups, some motivated to bring about social disruption. In addition, numerous sophisticated biotechnology laboratories that could provide essential supplies and facilities for potential bioterrorists onsite or by theft are located in California.

The public health infrastructure at the local and state levels must be prepared to detect, control, and prevent illness and injury resulting from biological and chemical terrorism, especially a covert terrorist attack. Preparation for bioterrorism involves strengthening of the existing infrastructure for the surveillance of infectious diseases; detection, and investigation of outbreaks; identification of etiologic agents and their modes of transmission; the development of prevention and control strategies; and; the mobilization and management of resources required to respond to disease outbreaks and other health emergencies.

The California Department of Health Services (CDHS) is developing a Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Plan for the detection and response to a biological or chemical terrorist attack. The following section of the plan addresses surveillance and epidemiologic response. The overall CDHS plan will include sections on bioterrorism preparedness; surveillance and epidemiologic response; the laboratory's role in bioterrorism detection and response; health and medical response; and, communication. The plan will be compliant with the Standardized Emergency Management System for the request and activation of resources. This plan is a working document that will be updated to reflect new developments and lessons learned in bioterrorism preparedness and response.

SURVEILLANCE AND EPIDEMIOLOGIC RESPONSE SECTION

Early detection of bioterrorist events is essential because although most diseases caused by bioterrorist threat agents are rapidly fatal, many are readily treatable and/or preventable with timely administration of appropriate antibiotics, antisera, vaccination, and/or prophylaxis following exposure. If the bioterrorist event involves a disease that is transmissible from person-to-person, early detection would also allow timely implementation of isolation and/or quarantine guidelines to prevent additional cases.

A coordinated epidemiologic investigation must be conducted as soon as a suspected bioterrorist event is detected to determine the etiology and source of the outbreak and to identify the most effective interventions to save as many lives as possible.

The objectives of this bioterrorism surveillance and epidemiologic response section are:

- 1) To describe how CDHS plans to enhance surveillance and epidemiologic response for suspected bioterrorist event(s);
- 2) To define roles and relationships between local health departments and CDHS partners in bioterrorist surveillance and epidemiologic response activities; and
- 3) To provide guidance to local health departments regarding bioterrorism surveillance and response strategies at the local level.

II. Bioterrorist Event Definitions

For the earliest recognition of bioterrorism, public health personnel who conduct traditional disease investigations must become familiar with unusual disease events that should increase the index of suspicion for bioterrorism. To help facilitate this early recognition among local public health officials, this section of the bioterrorism surveillance and epidemiology document attempts to define disease scenarios that may represent the initial report of a bioterrorist event.

The bioterrorist threat agents deemed the highest priority by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) are the causes of: anthrax (*Bacillus anthracis*), botulism (*Clostridium botulinum*), plague (*Yersinia pestis*), smallpox (variola major), tularemia (*Francisella tularensis*), and viral hemorrhagic fevers (filoviruses and arenaviruses). These agents are prioritized by the CDC based on their potential ease of dissemination, ability to cause high mortality, the need for special preparations such as vaccine development or antibiotic stockpiles and finally, the social disruption they could cause (See Appendix A for list of CDC bioterrorism threat agents). In addition, the California Department of Health Services (CDHS) has concern for the *Brucella* species as a serious potential bioterrorist threat agent in California.

With the exceptions of smallpox (the endemic transmission of which has been globally eradicated) and filoviruses, human diseases caused by these threat agents do occur in California, albeit rarely. Thus, to distinguish the patterns of disease that would be

suspicious for bioterrorism from the normal patterns of disease in California, we reviewed the surveillance data reported to CDHS from 1990 to 2000. Based on this review we categorized a list of disease events to reflect the level of concern that a particular scenario may represent as a true bioterrorist event, as well as the acuity of the public health response that would be elicited. If a disease event on the following list is detected by local public health officials, the local and state bioterrorism response partners should be immediately notified (see Notification, Section IV).

However, this list is not meant to be all-inclusive since there are many other common foodor water-borne agents that could potentially be used in a bioterrorist attack (e.g., the intentional contamination of salad bars with *Salmonella* Typhimurium at The Dalles, Oregon in 1984). Furthermore, while these event definitions may facilitate the early recognition of bioterrorism, public health personnel should always be alert to the occurrence of any unusual epidemiologic features that may be found through the investigation of a seemingly natural outbreak (e.g., absence of the usual risk factors for disease, or greater than expected morbidity or mortality). CDHS' Division of Communicable Disease Control (DCDC) staff is available 24 hours a day to assist local health departments in determining whether an unusual illness or cluster of illnesses should be considered suspicious for bioterrorism. The disease-specific investigation algorithms may be useful in helping to determine whether bioterrorism should be suspected (See Appendix B for Disease-Specific Investigation Algorithms).

Highly suggestive of bioterrorism:

A single definitively diagnosed or strongly suspected case of:

- Smallpox
- Inhalational anthrax
- Cutaneous anthrax (with no known risk factors compatible with naturally-occurring disease)
- Viral hemorrhagic fever (in a patient with no international travel history)

OR

Greater than one case of:

- Pneumonic plague
- Pneumonic tularemia

with at least one laboratory confirmed case, no known compatible risk factors, and occurring in a brief time period

OR

A higher than expected number of unexplained deaths occurring in a brief time period within a defined geographic region.

Moderately suggestive of bioterrorism:

A single definitively diagnosed or strongly suspected case of:

- Pneumonic plaque
- Pneumonic tularemia

occurring in a patient with no known compatible risk factors

OR

A cluster of brucellosis cases occurring in persons with no known compatible risk factors

OR

A higher than expected number of presumptively diagnosed botulism cases with no known compatible risk factors occurring in a brief time period

OR

A higher than expected number of cases of unexplained severe respiratory illness requiring hospitalization, especially if occurring outside the usual flu transmission season

OR

The occurrence of any unusual epidemiologic features in a seemingly natural outbreak (e.g., the absence of the usual risk factors for disease, or the presence of unusual risk factors, or greater than expected morbidity or mortality).

III. Confirmation

Confirmation that a bioterrorism event definition has been met may require consultation among local, state, and/or federal public health officials. CDHS disease experts, including laboratorians, stand ready to assist local public health officials in assessing the clinical, laboratory, and epidemiologic features of a disease event to determine whether the disease scenario is suspicious for bioterrorism. The disease-specific investigation algorithms may be useful in helping to determine whether bioterrorism should be suspected (See Appendix B for Disease-Specific Investigation Algorithms).

IV. Notification of Suspected/Confirmed Bioterrorist Events

Once local, state and/or federal public health officials confirm that a disease scenario meets the event definition for bioterrorism, local, state, and federal bioterrorism response partners should be immediately notified.

At the local level, the local health department (LHD) is responsible for contacting their local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) office. FBI is the lead law enforcement agency for crisis management of a bioterrorist event.

The State should be notified by the LHD through two major notification routes. The LHD should contact the Governor's Office of Emergency Services (OES) and should notify the California Department of Health Services (CDHS) directly by contacting the Division of Communicable Disease Control's Duty Officer of the Day (DCDC DOD) or a DCDC Bioterrorism Key Contact. The DCDC DOD is on-call 24 hours a day and is responsible for responding to all calls involving infectious disease emergencies.

When the LHD contacts the state through the OES, the LHD will call the OES Warning Control Center. The OES Warning Control Center receives warnings and notifications of all disasters in California, including acts of bioterrorism, and is responsible for notifying all appropriate local, state, and federal agencies. In the event of bioterrorism, the OES will notify CDHS Duty Officer (CDHS DO). The CDHS DO triages calls regarding public health emergencies. The CDHS DO receiving a call involving a suspected bioterrorist event will notify the CDHS Emergency Preparedness Office (CDHS EPO) Counterterrorism Coordinator and the DCDC DOD or a DCDC Bioterrorism Key Contact.

Within DCDC, four Bioterrorism Key Contacts have been identified: the State Epidemiologist, the Bioterrorism Surveillance and Epidemiologic Response Team (BSERT) Leader, the Viral and Rickettsial Disease Laboratory (VRDL) Chief, and the Microbial Diseases Laboratory (MDL) Chief. Only one Key Contact is required to be contacted, but they should be called IN ORDER until one is successfully reached (i.e., if the State Epidemiologist cannot be contacted, the BSERT Leader should be called next).

When the LHD calls the DCDC directly, they may call either the DCDC DOD or a DCDC Bioterrorism Key Contact. If the DCDC DOD is the first to be notified by the LHD, the DCDC DOD should call the CDHS DO. The DCDC DOD should also call the four DCDC Bioterrorism Key Contacts IN ORDER until one is reached.

The first DCDC Bioterrorism Key Contact to be reached is responsible for ensuring the notification of all members of the DCDC Bioterrorism Working Group: DCDC Chief, Disease Investigations and Surveillance Branch (DISB) Chief, Disease Investigations Section (DIS) Chief, Veterinary Public Health Section (VPHS) Chief, Vector Borne Diseases Section (VBDS) Chief, Surveillance and Statistics Section (SSS) Chief, BSERT Leader, VRDL Chief, and MDL Chief. If a member of the Working Group cannot be contacted, his or her designated alternate should be contacted. If the DCDC Bioterrorism Key Contact will also notify the DCDC DOD and the CDHS DO. The Key Contact is also responsible for

verifying that the local FBI office has already been contacted and, if not, to notify it of the situation.

When the CDHS DO first learns of a bioterrorist event through DCDC (either the DCDC DOD or a DCDC Bioterrorism Key Contact), he or she will notify the OES Warning Control Center and the CDHS EPO Counterterrorism Coordinator. The EPO Counterterrorism Coordinator will call the DCDC DOD or the DCDC Bioterrorism Key Contact to coordinate communications with the DCDC Bioterrorism Working Group.

Once the DCDC Bioterrorism Working Group is notified, the Working Group will contact the Health Officers of the appropriate LHDs. The Health Officers are then responsible for the notification of the appropriate personnel in their jurisdictions.

The Working Group will also notify the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program (BPRP) at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

Notification Phone Numbers

CA Department of Health Services, Division of Communicable Disease Control

1-510-540-2566 (regular business hours)

1-800-971-9631 (pager for evenings, weekends, holidays)

1-510-540-2308 (security guard can contact DCDC DOD at home and/or via pager)


OES Warning Center

1-800-421-2921 or

1-916-262-1621 (24 hours, 365 days/year)

FBI

| 1-310-477-6565 | Los Angeles Division |
|----------------|------------------------|
| 1-916-481-9110 | Sacramento Division |
| 1-858-565-1255 | San Diego Division |
| 1-415-553-7400 | San Francisco Division |



V. Surveillance Systems for Detecting Bioterrorist Events

A. Introduction

1. Essential role of surveillance

An act of terrorism involving the release of a biological agent is a major public health emergency and requires immediate response. In contrast to other emergency events, an attack with a biological agent will probably not be detected at the time the event occurs, nor will it elicit an immediate response from police, fire or emergency medical services personnel. This is because an attack with a biological agent is likely to be covert and also because there is a delay between exposure and onset of symptoms (incubation period) which can be as long as several days, weeks or months. The difficulty of early detection is further compounded because diseases caused by many of the likely bioterrorist agents may not be accurately diagnosed until late in their course, since early symptoms tend to be non-specific. Finally, most clinicians in the United States have little or no experience with these agents (e.g., inhalational anthrax or smallpox).

Early detection of bioterrorist events is essential because although most bioterrorist threat diseases ¹ are rapidly fatal and some are easily transmitted from person-to-person, many bioterrorist threat diseases are readily treatable and/or preventable if patients are provided timely and proper antibiotics, antisera and/or immunization following exposure. Conversely, bioterrorist threat diseases may prove fatal if therapy or prophylaxis is delayed until classic symptoms develop.

Early detection and rapid investigation by public health epidemiologists is critical for determining the scope and magnitude of the exposure. Delays in detection and/or epidemiologic investigation may result in illness and deaths.

2. Roles and responsibilities of CDHS

The roles and responsibilities of CDHS in bioterrorism surveillance include:

1) supporting local health departments to increase awareness of clinicians and laboratorians about bioterrorist threat agents and diseases; 2) strengthening existing disease surveillance systems; 3) utilizing and/or developing additional surveillance systems which might be useful in detecting illness resulting from bioterrorist threat agents; 4) providing technical assistance to local health jurisdictions implementing pilot surveillance systems for detecting bioterrorist events; and 5) coordinating expanded surveillance in the affected jurisdictions in the event of a

¹ The bioterrorist threat agents deemed the highest priority by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) are the causes of: anthrax (*Bacillus anthracis*), botulism (*Clostridium botulinum*), plague (*Yersinia pestis*), smallpox (variola major), tularemia (*Francisella tularensis*), and viral hemorrhagic fevers (filoviruses and arenaviruses). (See Appendix A for complete list of CDC high-priority diseases).

suspected bioterrorist event or other biologic disaster (see Epidemiologic Response, Section VI). Specific CDHS activities to enhance bioterrorism surveillance include:

- The revision of state disease reporting regulations to make all suspected and confirmed cases of bioterrorist threat diseases immediately reportable;
- The implementation of a rapid electronic laboratory disease reporting and alert system;
- The development of tools for increasing awareness about bioterrorism (e.g., slide sets, fact sheets, training curricula);
- The implementation of informal intra- and inter-departmental notification of unusual health events detected by existing surveillance systems (e.g., veterinary surveillance, botulinum antitoxin requests, influenza surveillance project);
- The provision of technical assistance to local health departments piloting systems or mechanisms that could be useful in the detection of bioterrorist events including surrogate measure monitoring (e.g., hospital admission diagnoses; 911 calls) and clinical syndrome reporting.

3. Roles and responsibilities of local health departments

The local health department has the lead role in the early detection and identification of a bioterrorist event. And, in the event of a confirmed bioterrorist event or other large biologic disaster, the local health department will be responsible for initiating expanded surveillance (described in Epidemiologic Response, Section VI).

At the minimum, local health departments should implement activities to educate clinicians and laboratorians about:

- their disease reporting responsibilities, especially of outbreaks and unusual disease occurrences:
- bioterrorist threat agents and diseases; and
- how to contact the local health department in case of a public health emergency.

Local health departments could also establish and/or strengthen informal disease reporting links with other partners (e.g., animal control, veterinarians, medical examiners and coroners, infection control practitioners, poison control centers, quarantine personnel).

If resources are available, local health departments may choose to implement pilot surveillance projects for improving the early detection of bioterrorist threat diseases and infectious disease outbreaks.

The following section of the CDHS bioterrorism surveillance and epidemiology plan includes an overview of activities which the state plans to implement to improve surveillance for bioterrorist events and a description of additional activities which could be considered at the state or local health department level if resources are available.

B. Overview of strategies for improving bioterrorism surveillance

Existing disease reporting systems in California are neither sensitive nor timely enough to allow a rapid response to a bioterrorist event. Current estimates are that only about 20% of some reportable diseases are actually reported in some California counties². Physicians are not fully meeting their legally mandated requirements to report communicable disease occurrences because of lack of knowledge, time, interest, and the current cumbersome (paper-based) reporting process.

Early detection of bioterrorist events may be achieved through a spectrum of activities. At one end of the spectrum are detection systems that are more specific but less timely, which include mandatory reporting of diseases and conditions by health care professionals and laboratories. At the opposite end of the spectrum are detection systems that are more sensitive and timely, but less specific. For example, emergency medical services systems could collect sensitive and timely data on hospital diversion hours or 911 calls, but follow-up investigation is needed to determine whether an increase in diversions or calls is due to an unusual health event.

Strategies for strengthening the early detection of bioterrorist events may be grouped into the following categories:

- Increasing awareness of clinicians and laboratorians;
- Strengthening the communicable disease reporting system;
- Utilizing additional surveillance systems; and
- Piloting novel detection systems.

1. Increasing awareness of clinicians and laboratorians

Early detection depends upon healthcare provider and laboratorian recognition and reporting of suspicious illnesses and organisms. Increasing the awareness of clinicians and laboratorians about bioterrorist threat agents and diseases is an important strategy for improving bioterrorism surveillance. Some strategies and tools that CDHS and local health departments could use to increase awareness about bioterrorism are listed below.

² System Requirements and Feasibility Analysis for Communicable Disease Reporting via the Internet in California, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory report sponsored by CDHS (October 1998).

a. Strategies for increasing awareness about bioterrorism

Education of clinicians and laboratorians about their essential roles in recognizing and reporting a possible bioterrorist event and/or other infectious disease outbreak(s) could be achieved in a variety of settings. Presentations could be given at clinical rounds at local hospitals and at meetings of local professional organizations, targeting specialists in internal medicine, emergency medicine, pediatrics, family practice, infectious diseases, critical care, pulmonary medicine, and pathology. Other target audiences include pre-hospital care providers, infection control practitioners, physician-trainees and medical students, medical examiners, veterinarians, and microbiologists. Training seminars are being given to public health laboratory personnel, health maintenance organization (HMO) laboratory personnel and other hospital laboratory personnel throughout California.

Bulletins on bioterrorism and fact sheets on the bioterrorist threat agents could be widely distributed to the medical and laboratory communities via the internet and via traditional means (mailing). Posters that list the notifiable diseases and remind health providers (emergency departments, intensive care, etc.) of their reporting obligations could also be printed and distributed. All of these activities provide an excellent opportunity for reinforcing surveillance and reporting in general.

b. Tools for increasing awareness about bioterrorism

Training curricula, disease fact sheets, and other tools for increasing awareness about bioterrorism are being developed for distribution to local health departments for use at the local level. Additional training materials are being developed for public health professionals and laboratorians including laboratory bench training and distance learning modules.

Slide presentation: CDHS has contracted with the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) to develop a slide set with speaker's notes to be used in presentations for clinicians (see Appendix C). Santa Clara County has concurrently developed a presentation on the clinician's role in the detection and reporting of outbreaks and unusual disease occurrences, including bioterrorist threat diseases (see Appendix D).

Fact sheets: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is developing several sets of bioterrorist threat agent specific fact sheets for the media, the public, health care providers, and public health personnel.

Bioterrorist threat disease clinical descriptions: The California Local Health and State Department Bioterrorism Surveillance Working Group is developing clinical descriptions for syndromes caused the priority biological and chemical threat agents (see Appendix E). The descriptions could be distributed locally to the community to help increase awareness of clinical scenarios suggesting bioterrorism.

Public Health Workshops and School of Public Health Course: Practical, scenario-based workshops for front-line public health professionals are also being developed and implemented by UCLA. In addition, an in-depth course on bioterrorism and public health has been developed for the UCLA School of Public Health and was first offered in 2001. This course is open to students of public health and health care professionals in the community who desire a broader theoretical and practical knowledge base in the health impact of bioterrorist incidents.

2. Strengthening the communicable disease reporting system

Approaches to strengthening the existing disease reporting system include:

1) revision of disease reporting regulations to make all suspected and confirmed cases of bioterrorist threat diseases immediately reportable by health care providers and laboratories; and 2) implementation of a rapid electronic laboratory disease alert and reporting system.

a. Reporting regulations

Immediate reporting of all bioterrorist threat diseases is critical for limiting the impact of the bioterrorist event. Emergency amendments³ to the California Code of Regulations (Title 17), effective as of November 5, 2001, made those diseases that pose a significant threat as agents of biological terrorism immediately reportable by health care providers⁴ to the local health department (LHD); by the LHD to the CDHS; and by clinical laboratories, public health laboratories, and veterinary laboratories to the LHD.

The current status of the emergency regulations require health care providers to immediately report by telephone all suspected and confirmed cases of bioterrorist threat diseases, which include anthrax, botulism, brucellosis, plague (animal or human), smallpox (variola), tularemia, varicella (deaths only), viral hemorrhagic fevers, unusual

³The emergency amendments to the California Code of Regulations (Title 17) are available on the Internet at http://www.dhs.ca.gov/regulation.

⁴ Health care providers include physicians, surgeons, veterinarians, podiatrists, physician assistants, registered nurses, nurse midwives, school nurses, infection control practitioners, medical examiners, coroners and dentists.

diseases⁵, and outbreaks of any disease to the local health department. In addition, the emergency regulations also require local health officers to immediately report to CDHS by telephone upon being notified of suspected or confirmed cases of the bioterrorist threat diseases listed above.

The emergency regulation amendments also expand reporting responsibilities of clinical laboratories, approved public health laboratories, and veterinary laboratories. In addition to the 18 communicable diseases that were already reportable to the local health department within 24 hours of providing results to the physician, the newly adopted emergency regulations require laboratories to report laboratory findings indicative of the specified bioterrorist threat agent to the local health department within one hour of providing results to the physician.

Furthermore, the emergency amendments to the regulations require that whenever a laboratory receives a specimen for the laboratory diagnosis of suspected human anthrax, botulism, brucellosis, or tularemia, it must communicate by telephone with the CDHS' Microbial Diseases Laboratory (510-540-2242) for instruction (as was already required for plague); similarly, any laboratory receiving specimens for the laboratory diagnosis of suspected smallpox or viral hemorrhagic fever agents must communicate immediately by telephone with the CDHS' Viral and Rickettsial Disease Laboratory (510-307-8575) for instruction.

b. Electronic laboratory reporting

Monitoring electronic reports of requests for laboratory tests and laboratory test results could provide the earliest recognition of a bioterrorist incident.

CDHS is developing the California Electronic Laboratory Disease Alert and Reporting (CELDAR) system for improving laboratory surveillance. Electronic records will include laboratory requests for specified tests and laboratory results (positives and "probable positives"). A list of 28 electronically reportable diseases has been proposed, including anthrax, brucellosis, botulism, plague (animal or

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⁵ 'Unusual disease' means a rare disease or a newly apparent or emerging disease or syndrome of uncertain etiology that a health care provider has reason to believe could possibly be caused by a transmissible infectious agent or by a microbial toxin.

human), tularemia, and 'unusual diseases'6.

In 2000, a demonstration system was developed and tested to conduct electronic laboratory reporting from the Microbial Diseases Laboratory (MDL) of CDHS in Berkeley over the CDHS intranet to the Surveillance and Statistics Section (SSS) of CDHS in Sacramento using CDC data standards. In 2001, CELDAR will expand to include four local public health laboratories (Los Angeles, San Joaquin, Sacramento and San Diego). Electronic laboratory reporting data for animal anthrax and brucellosis will also be transmitted from the California Animal Health and Food Safety (CAHFS) Laboratory System to CELDAR. Longer-term plans include the expansion of CELDAR to include additional local public health laboratories, a large health maintenance organization's laboratories and private commercial laboratories.

Indicators to monitor include unusually high numbers of requests for certain tests, initial positive lab findings for unusual infections, and laboratory requests or results for diseases that are unusual in that geographic area. The electronic reporting system will simultaneously transmit laboratory results to the CDHS Surveillance and Statistics Section and to the local health department. It will also be set up to automatically generate and broadcast alerts to BSERT, MDL, and local health department personnel.

3. Utilizing additional surveillance systems for detecting illness resulting from bioterrorist threat agents

The integration of information from other surveillance systems into the routine communicable disease reporting system could facilitate the early detection of a bioterrorist event. Existing surveillance systems that are currently being integrated to facilitate bioterrorism surveillance are described in Section A of Appendix F and include veterinary surveillance, botulism surveillance, and the California Influenza Surveillance Project.

Systems or mechanisms that could be further developed for integration are described in Section B of the Appendix F and include the Unexplained Illness and Death (UNEX) Project, the Human Encephalitis Surveillance Project, the Equine/Ratite Encephalitis Surveillance Project, vector-borne disease surveillance, the Border Infectious Disease Surveillance Project, and varicella death surveillance.

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⁶ Other proposed electronically reported diseases include chlamydial infections, cryptosporidiosis, diphtheria, encephalitis, *Escherichia coli* 0157:H7, gonorrhea, hepatitis A, hepatitis B, listeriosis, malaria, measles, rabies (animal or human), syphilis, tuberculosis, typhoid, *Vibrio* spp. infections, shigellosis, *Yersinia enterocolitica*, giardiasis, cyclosporiasis, meningitis, streptococcal infections - Group A, unusual diseases, melioidosis.

4. Piloting novel detection methods such as surrogate measure monitoring and clinical syndrome reporting

Where resources are available, local health departments are developing systems for detecting and responding to non-specific increases in surrogate markers (e.g., absenteeism, emergency department presenting complaints, emergency department diversions) and increases in numbers of patients seeking care for specific clinical syndromes. CDHS will endeavor to provide technical assistance when requested and will monitor the progress of pilot projects.

a. Surrogate indicator monitoring

Indirect or surrogate indicators may be useful for monitoring the presence of abnormal levels of disease, as well as for detecting a bioterrorist event. Systems for monitoring surrogate indicator data will require the development of algorithms and statistical methods for detecting unusual or suspicious events. Although surrogate measure data have the potential of being timely and sensitive, they are not specific. Unusual findings necessitate follow-up by the local public health department requiring significant resources.

Potential data sources include:

- 911 dispatch
- Emergency department diversions
- Emergency department visits or diagnoses
- Nurse advice call centers
- Poison control centers
- Over-the-counter pharmacy sales
- Medical examiner/vital statistics
- Hospital admissions/diagnoses
- Critical care unit admissions/diagnoses
- Absenteeism in schools/large worksites

b. Clinical syndrome reporting

Clinical syndrome surveillance, the reporting of clinical syndromes rather than specific diagnoses and/or laboratory-confirmed cases, has the potential for facilitating the early detection of a bioterrorist event. Clinical syndrome surveillance can be extremely resource-intensive since it requires the establishment of new infrastructure for collecting, reporting, and responding to data. Clinical syndrome reporting projects are described in Section C of the Appendix F.

VI. Epidemiologic Response to Suspected/Confirmed Bioterrorist Events

Although the steps in the epidemiologic response to a suspected bioterrorist event will be similar to other communicable disease outbreaks, the tempo will be much faster. These steps are listed below in order; however, many will be conducted simultaneously, and the importance of a particular step may vary depending on the circumstances of the outbreak. The epidemiologic preparedness and investigation checklists may be useful in the epidemiologic response planning process (See Appendices G and H for Checklists).

A. Confirmation

The first step in the epidemiologic response to a disease scenario suspicious for bioterrorism will be to reach a consensus that bioterrorism is moderately or strongly suspected, whether for a single case or for a cluster of cases (See Event Definitions, Section II). Local, state, and federal disease experts will help determine whether the clinical and/or laboratory findings are consistent with a bioterrorist threat agent and/or whether the epidemiologic evidence supports the suspicion of bioterrorism.

The CDHS Microbial Diseases Laboratory (MDL) or the Viral and Rickettsial Disease Laboratory (VRDL) will be involved in confirming the causative agent in a potential bioterrorist event (See Laboratory Section of the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Plan). However, in the case of diseases for which prompt laboratory diagnosis is not possible (e.g., smallpox), specimens will be forwarded to a national reference laboratory for laboratory confirmation, and clinical and other criteria will necessarily be relied upon to determine whether a disease scenario meets the event definition for bioterrorism.

B. Notification

Once it is agreed that the disease scenario meets the event definition for bioterrorism, local, state, and federal bioterrorism response partners will be immediately notified (see Notification, Section IV). The CDHS Bioterrorism Surveillance and Epidemiologic Response Team (BSERT) will be activated and will serve as the state's core epidemiologic rapid response team.

C. Coordination

California's epidemiologic response to a bioterrorist event will be coordinated by the CDHS/DCDC in the event of a multi-jurisdictional infectious disease outbreak. Local, state, and federal public health leaders will participate in the epidemiologic investigation under a joint command structure and the lead for the investigation will be determined through the joint command. In the event of a bioterrorist outbreak involving a single health jurisdiction, the CDHS/DCDC will be available to provide epidemiologic support if requested.

Several types of personnel may be required for the epidemiologic investigation including: interviewers, environmental health inspectors, disease control investigators, epidemiologists, data entry staff, and data managers. Personnel will be drawn from affected and from unaffected local health departments and from CDHS/DCDC. Approximately 40 to 50 staff members of DCDC can provide epidemiologic, interviewing, investigative, and data management assistance. More than 100 other public health professionals from CDHS' Prevention Services group are available to provide support. Finally, federal epidemiologic assistance can be requested from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

The epidemiologic investigation will be coordinated with the criminal investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the lead agency in the crisis management of a bioterrorist event.

D. Communication

Information from the outbreak investigation will be communicated to other California bioterrorism response partners such as the Office of Emergency Services (OES) and the Emergency Medical Services Authority (EMSA) to help guide planning for distribution of medical resources, and to the FBI.

In the event of an outbreak involving multiple health jurisdictions, release of public information regarding the epidemiologic investigation and response will be coordinated by the local health department public health information officers and the CDHS Office of Public Affairs (OPA) with the FBI to assure accurate and consistent public health messages (see Medical Response and Media Sections of the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Plan).

Messages may include information about the disease and its prevention, treatment and control, and the progress of the outbreak investigation. If the disease is thought to be transmissible from person-to-person, requests for locating contacts could be communicated through the media. Recommendations for treatment of cases and contacts will also be communicated directly to medical care providers by those coordinating the medical response (see Medical Response Section of the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Plan). Treatment and prophylaxis guidelines, infection control guidelines, and disease fact sheets will be included in the Medical Response Section of the Bioterrorism Plan.

E. Epidemiologic investigation

In a multi-jurisdictional bioterrorist event, local, state, and federal public health leaders will participate in the epidemiologic investigation under a joint command structure. The lead for the epidemiologic investigation will be determined through the joint command. In the event of a bioterrorist outbreak involving a single health jurisdiction, the CDHS/DCDC will be available to provide epidemiologic support if requested.

1. Hypothesis-generating interviews

Hypothesis-generating interviews with the initial cases will be conducted as early as possible in the epidemiologic investigation to help identify the causal agent and possible modes and locations of exposure. If the specific etiologic agent for the illness has not been identified, investigators will need to ask a broad array of exploratory clinical and exposure questions to better characterize the disease outbreak. However, if the causal agent (or agents) has been identified, questionnaires with disease-specific clinical questions combined with exploratory exposure questions will be more appropriate. Template syndromic and disease-specific questionnaires have been developed for this purpose (See Appendices I and J). Exploratory and indepth risk exposure questions have been developed to assess various potential modes of exposure and have been included in both the syndromic and disease-specific questionnaires.

Regardless of whether the syndromic or the disease-specific questionnaires are used in hypothesis-generating interviews, the template questionnaires will have to be modified at the time of the event to reflect or incorporate available information and hypotheses. Information from the initial cases will be used to construct an epidemiologic curve, demographic and clinical profiles, and to determine possible sources of exposure.

2. Case Definition

Using the data from the initial hypothesis-generating interviews, a working case definition will be established. A uniform case definition will be used to identify additional cases requiring follow-up and to provide a meaningful case count across jurisdictions.

3. Case Finding

Case finding will be conducted by local and state public health officials through alerts to multiple potential reporting sources, including:

- Public health officials and personnel
- Public health and clinical laboratories
- Hospitals, physicians, and infection control practitioners
- Emergency medical services
- Media

Public health alerts could recommend that persons with symptoms promptly seek health care. If the source of initial exposure is known, the alerts could also recommend that persons who believe that they have been exposed should telephone the local health department for further instructions.

Hotlines could be established at the local health department to receive calls from clinicians and the public about potential cases and contacts.

The CDHS Telephone Intake Form (see Appendix K) was developed for use by local health departments to facilitate the management of incoming telephone calls during an outbreak.

4. Case Interviews

Cases will be interviewed using a uniform questionnaire. A pre-prepared template questionnaire (see Appendix J) will be modified using information generated from the hypothesis-generating interviews, to further characterize the mode or source of the exposure. In a multi-jurisdictional event, interviews will be conducted by local and state public health personnel.

5. Data Analysis

Data entry and analysis for epidemiologic investigation and contact tracing activities will be coordinated by CDHS/DCDC when a bioterrorist event involves multiple health jurisdictions. If a bioterrorist event involves a single health jurisdiction, the CDHS/DCDC will be available to provide data analysis support to the local health department. The primary objective of data analysis will be to provide timely, comprehensive data for public health and public safety decision-makers to formulate control measures to mitigate the public health impact of the event. The outbreak investigation monitoring tool can help facilitate data management and analysis activities throughout the investigation (see Appendix L).

Epidemiologists will analyze data collected from case interviews to determine:

- The magnitude and distribution of the outbreak
- Time, location, and mode of exposure
- Demographics of affected persons
- Vehicle(s) of exposure
- Persons at risk for disease (from either initial exposure or secondarily through contact with a case) who will need treatment, prophylaxis, and medical follow-up.

F. Contact tracing

If the disease is transmissible from person-to-person, those responsible for contact management will endeavor to interview possible contacts identified by cases and those identified through other means (e.g., hotline) to confirm their contact status (see Table 1 for disease-specific contact definitions). All clinical and epidemiologic information will be entered into a database for analysis. (See Appendix M for contact tracing forms for plague, smallpox and viral hemorrhagic fevers.)

All persons identified as contacts should be referred for vaccination, prophylaxis, isolation and/or quarantine as appropriate and should be kept under active surveillance (temperature checks twice a day) by those responsible for contact management (see Table 1). Contacts who develop fever will be advised to seek medical attention immediately (See Table 1 and Contact Management Algorithms, Appendix N).

Contact management forms have been developed for plague, smallpox, and viral hemorrhagic fevers (VHFs) to help facilitate the management of data from all contacts under surveillance (See Appendix O for Master Contact Surveillance Forms).

Table 1. Contact tracing guidelines (subject to revision upon release of CDC agent-specific guidelines)

| | | PRIMARY | VIRAL | |
|-------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|--|
| | SMALLPOX ⁷ | PNEUMONIC | HEMORHAGIC | |
| | | PLAGUE ⁸ | FEVERS (VHF) ⁹ | |
| Definition of a | A person who has | A person having had | A person having had | |
| contact | been in the same | household, hospital | physical contact with | |
| | household as the | and/or face-to-face | a case or the body | |
| | infected individual or | contact with persons | fluids of a case within | |
| | who has been in face- | with primary | 3 weeks after the | |
| | to-face contact with | pneumonic plague | onset of illness. | |
| | the patient after the | from the onset of | | |
| | onset of fever*. | symptoms through | | |
| | | completion of 48 | . | |
| | | hours of appropriate | Physical contact | |
| | F | antibiotic therapy. | includes sharing the | |
| | Face-to-face contact | | same room/ | |
| | is defined as contact | Face-to-face contact | bed, caring for the | |
| | with a patient at less | is defined as contact | patient, touching body | |
| | than 2 meters (6.5 | with a patient at less | fluids, testing patient | |
| | ft) ¹⁰ | than 2 meters (6.5 ft) | laboratory specimens. | |
| Temperature | | | | |
| checks (2x/day): | 17 days | 7 days | 21 days | |
| # days after last | | | | |
| exposure to case | | | | |
| Temperature at | | | | |
| which contact | > 100.4° F / 38° C | | | |
| should seek | | | | |
| medical attention | in locate all face to face cente | | | |

^{*}It may be necessary to locate all face-to-face contacts with the case up to 17 days prior to the case's onset of fever for epidemiologic purposes (e.g., to locate all persons who might have been exposed to a common source and who may also be ill or incubating infection) ¹¹.

SOURCE: CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES

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⁷ Adapted from JAMA Consensus Statement: Smallpox as a Biological Weapon, Medical and Public Health Management, 1999.

⁸ Adapted from JAMA Consensus Statement: Plague as a Biological Weapon, Medical and Public Health Management, 2000 and CDC Prevention of Plague: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practice, 1996.

⁹ Adapted from WHO recommended Guidelines for Epidemic Preparedness and Response: Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever (EHF), 1997 and APHA Control of Communicable Diseases Manual, 2000.

¹⁰ Adapted from Vaccinia Vaccine (Smallpox Vaccine) Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) – 2001.

¹¹ Adapted from Comprehensive Action in a Smallpox Emergency, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare.1971.

G. Laboratories

Epidemiologic response personnel will refer questions regarding specimen collection, packaging, storage, and shipment to the appropriate point of contact at the local public health laboratory (See Laboratory Section of Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Plan).

H. Expanded surveillance for non-human populations

If the disease outbreak is thought to involve animals, public health officials from the Vector-Borne Diseases Section (VBDS) and Veterinary Public Health Section (VPHS) will coordinate enhanced vector and veterinary surveillance as necessary.

The ability of an aerosolized release of a vector-borne bioterrorist agent targeted against humans to subsequently affect reservoir populations depends on many factors (e.g., specific location – indoors or outdoors, geographical location – urban or rural, presence of competent reservoir and vector populations, climatic factors, season, etc.). The actual likelihood of such an occurrence would presumably be low. However, if location and environmental factors were conducive to exposing competent reservoir populations to the bioterrorist agent, it would be prudent to establish surveillance and possible vector control activities.

After an aerosolized release of a vector-borne bioterrorist agent, VBDS could conduct a risk assessment to determine the risk of subsequent vector-borne transmission (by measuring the local vector/reservoir densities and their competencies. This could be very useful for those involved in the managing the bioterrorist event response.

Domestic and wildlife populations may experience morbidity and mortality due to bioterrorist agents. If animals are affected in a bioterrorist attack, VPHS will coordinate with California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA), the California Department of Fish and Game (CDFG), and veterinary practitioners to monitor susceptible animal populations and to implement appropriate control measures (e.g., quarantine, treatment, and vaccination) to prevent spread of the disease within animal populations.

I. Recommendations for public health action

Experts have compiled consensus treatment and post-exposure prophylaxis guidelines for the top-threat bioterrorist agents (See Medical Response Section of the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Plan). However, in addition to the consensus treatment guidelines, results from analyses of outbreak-specific epidemiologic data will be used to identify the exposed population(s), priority groups for prophylaxis, and the appropriate strategies for quarantine and isolation. This information will be provided to those responsible for coordinating the medical response.

The Medical Response Section of the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Plan will also contain guidelines and recommendations for disease prevention and control measures, including:

- Treatment of cases
- Prophylactic treatment of exposed persons
- Isolation of cases and quarantine of exposed persons, if necessary
- Use of personal protective equipment (PPE)
- Implementation of infection control practices
- Appropriate handling of the vehicle or source, if necessary

J. Overt or announced bioterrorist threat

The epidemiologic response to an overt or announced bioterrorism event shall be guided by the FBI and law enforcement assessment of the credibility of the threat. If the FBI believes the threat to be credible and has obtained information about the time, place, mode, and/or contents of the release, this information should be made available by the FBI to public health personnel as soon as possible so that public health can:

- define the population at risk for exposure to the biological agent;
- locate the persons at risk for exposure as soon as possible to assess them for illness and provide appropriate preventive treatment;
- monitor the persons who have received preventive treatment for symptoms or signs of disease; and
- implement enhanced surveillance for the suspected disease at health care facilities, laboratories, and emergency medical services. Active surveillance for diseases caused by other potential bioterrorist threat agents should also be conducted, as multiple biological agents may have been released at the same time or serially.

Notification of public health and medical personnel and any release of public information shall be coordinated with the FBI. The epidemiologic investigation shall be coordinated with the FBI's criminal investigation.

If cases of illness are found that do not fit epidemiologically with the alleged time, place, or mode of exposure, a full epidemiologic investigation should be conducted to determine the actual time and conditions of exposure, just as if the event had been covert.

APPENDIX A: CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC) TOP PRIORITY BIOTERRORISM THREAT AGENTS

Category A

High-priority agents include organisms that pose a risk to national security because they:

- can be easily disseminated or transmitted person-to-person
- cause high mortality, with potential for major public health impact
- might cause public panic and social disruption
- require special action for public health preparedness

Category A agents include:

- Bacillus anthracis (anthrax)
- Clostridium botulinum toxin (botulism)
- Francisella tularensis (tularemia)
- variola major (smallpox)
- Yersinia pestis (plague)
- Filoviruses
 - Ebola virus (Ebola hemorrhagic fever)
 - Marburg virus (Marburg hemorrhagic fever)
- Arenaviruses
 - Junin virus (Argentinian hemorrhagic fever) and related viruses
 - Lassa virus (Lassa fever)

Category B

Second highest priority agents include those that:

- are moderately easy to disseminate
- cause moderate morbidity and low mortality
- require specific enhancements of public health diagnostic capacity and enhanced disease surveillance

Category B agents include:

- Alphaviruses
 - Eastern and western equine encephalomyelitis viruses (EEE, WEE)

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- Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis virus (VEE)
- Brucella species (brucellosis)
- Burkholderia mallei (glanders)
- Coxiella burnetii (Q fever)
- Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens
- Ricin toxin from Ricinus communis
- Staphylococcal enterotoxin B

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A subset of Category B agents includes pathogens that are food- or waterborne. These pathogens include but are not limited to:

- Cryptosporidium parvum
- Escherichia coli O157:H7
- Salmonella species
- Shigella dysenteriae
- Vibrio cholerae

Category C

Third highest priority agents include emerging pathogens that could be engineered for mass dissemination in the future because of:

- availability
- ease of production and dissemination
- potential for high morbidity and mortality and major health impact


Category C agents include:

- Hantaviruses
- Multidrug-resistant tuberculosis
- Nipah virus
- Tickborne encephalitis viruses
- Tickborne hemorrhagic fever viruses
- Yellow fever

Preparedness for List C agents requires ongoing research to improve disease detection, diagnosis, treatment, and prevention.

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
APPENDIX B-1: BOTULISM INVESTIGATION ALGORITHM



SOURCE: CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES


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APPENDIX B-2: BRUCELLOSIS INVESTIGATION ALGORITHM




^{*}Information on brucellosis-enzootic areas may be obtained from CDHS, Disease Investigations and Surveillance Branch, Veterinary Public Health Section.

APPENDIX B-3: PNEUMONIC PLAGUE INVESTIGATION ALGORITHM




^{*}Information on plague-enzootic areas is available from CDHS, Disease Investigations and Surveillance Branch, Vector Borne Diseases Section.

APPENDIX B-4: PNEUMONIC TULAREMIA INVESTIGATION ALGORITHM



^{*}Information on tularemia-enzootic areas is available from CDHS, Disease Investigations and Surveillance Branch, Veterinary Public Health Section.

APPENDIX B-5: VIRAL HEMORRHAGIC FEVER (VHF) INVESTIGATION ALGORITHM



^{*}Information on areas where VHF is known to occur may be obtained from California Department of Health Services (CDHS), Division of Communicable Disease Control, Disease Investigation and Surveillance and Viral and Rickettsial Diseases Laboratory Branches.

APPENDIX C: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES (UCLA) SLIDE PRESENTATION:

"BIOTERRORISM: ARE YOU PREPARED?"

(Posted on CDHS website http://www.dhs.ca.gov/ps/dcdc/bt/index.htm)

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APPENDIX D: SANTA CLARA COUNTY PUBLIC HEALTH DEPARTMENT PRESENTATION:

"REPORTING A SUSPECT BIOTERRORISM (BT) EVENT: ROLE OF THE CLINICIAN, THE LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENT AND OTHERS"

(Posted on CDHS website http://www.dhs.ca.gov/ps/dcdc/bt/index.htm)

APPENDIX E: CLINICAL DESCRIPTIONS FOR SYNDROMES CAUSED BY PRIORITY BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL THREAT AGENTS

(Posted on CDHS website http://www.dhs.ca.gov/ps/dcdc/bt/index.htm)

APPENDIX E

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APPENDIX F: SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS FOR DETECTING ILLNESS FROM BIOTERRORIST THREAT AGENTS

The integration of information from other surveillance systems into the routine communicable disease reporting system could facilitate the early detection of a bioterrorist event. Existing surveillance systems that are currently being integrated to facilitate bioterrorism surveillance are described in Section A. Systems or mechanisms that could be further developed for integration are described in Section B.

Novel detection methods for detecting bioterrorist events include surrogate measure monitoring and clinical syndrome reporting. Clinical syndrome reporting projects are described in Section C.

A. INTEGRATING EXISTING SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS TO FACILITATE BIOTERRORISM SURVEILLANCE

Veterinary surveillance: A bioterrorist event might be detected concurrently or first in animals because most of the top threat bioterrorist agents are zoonotic. Veterinarians are required to report diseases and conditions of humans to their Local Health Department as described in Section VB2a. In addition, all licensed veterinarians and veterinary laboratories are required to report more than 50 contagious or transmissible diseases of animals to the Animal Health Branch of the California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA)¹. Die-offs and morbidity in commercial animal populations are also reportable events. However, die-offs and morbidity in non-commercial animal populations are not generally reported. Die-offs in wildlife populations are monitored and investigated by veterinarians with the California Department of Fish and Game (DFG).

The California Animal Health and Food Safety Laboratory System (CAHFSL), the Animal Health Branch of the CDFA, and DFG already informally communicate zoonotic disease events to the CDHS Veterinary Public Health Section (VPHS). This exchange will be supplemented by the inclusion of CAHFSL laboratory data on animal anthrax and brucellosis in the CELDAR electronic reporting system as described in Section VB2b.

Botulism: To facilitate detection of a bioterrorist event caused by botulinum toxin, CDHS will internally monitor botulinum antitoxin requests. CDHS provides epidemiologic consultation, laboratory diagnostic services and botulinum antitoxin to local health departments in suspected non-infant botulism cases. When foodborne, wound, or the adult form of infant botulism is suspected, antitoxin is released² from any of four locations depending on the location of the case or suspected case. Statewide data regarding antitoxin releases and laboratory confirmation of cases are available at

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¹ Animal plague and animal anthrax are reportable by telephone within 24 hours and animal brucellosis must be reported by mail within 3 days of diagnosis.

² The decision to use antitoxin is a clinical one and is not based on a laboratory test (which can typically take days).

CDHS, except for antitoxin releases and laboratory testing conducted by the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services.

Influenza Surveillance Project: Effective surveillance for influenza activity could facilitate recognition of a bioterrorist event since many potential bioterrorist agents may initially present with a nonspecific influenza-like illness (e.g., inhalational anthrax, smallpox, tularemia, brucellosis).

The California Influenza Surveillance Project (CISP) initiated in 1998, employs a variety of surveillance methods to monitor the timing and impact of annual influenza activity. Active surveillance during the influenza season includes the monitoring of: Kaiser inpatient admission data³; Kaiser anti-viral pharmacy data; Sentinel Physicians' reports of outpatient influenza-like illnesses⁴; respiratory virus isolation and detection data from approximately 19 county, hospital, academic, and private laboratories; ER diversion hours from 4 counties; and ambulance calls from 2 counties. Data collected outside of the normal influenza season include Kaiser inpatient admission data and Sentinel Physicians' reports.

Influenza surveillance data could prove to be very useful for detecting suspected bioterrorist events especially those occurring outside of the usual flu season. Data collection and analysis methods will need to be further developed and evaluated to determine their usefulness for the detection of bioterrorist events.

B. CANDIDATE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS THAT COULD BE INTEGRATED TO FACILITATE BIOTERRORISM SURVEILLANCE

Unexplained Illness and Death Project (UNEX): Several of the agents deemed most likely to be used in bioterrorism may cause the critical illness syndrome⁵ being studied in the Unexplained Illness and Death (UNEX) Project funded by the CDC. UNEX is a multi-state enhanced surveillance and intensified laboratory-testing program that identifies and evaluates cases of severe unexplained illness (fatal and nonfatal) in young persons based on syndrome-specific clinical presentations. At the moment, only fatal cases are being investigated, but eventually nonfatal cases will also be investigated. Alameda, Contra Costa, and San Francisco counties are the California counties included in the UNEX project, although clusters of cases with the critical illness syndrome in other California counties are also evaluated.

Cases are detected through both active and passive surveillance at participating UNEX project sites. All clinicians in the participating sites have been asked to report potential cases to local Emerging Infections Program (EIP) personnel. At the same time, EIP

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³ Inpatient diagnosis of pneumonia, influenza or influenza-like illness (ILI).

⁴ Fever greater than or equal to 100° F (≥37.8° C) and either cough or sore throat in the absence of a known cause.

 $^{^{5}}$ Any unexpected infectious death with the following criteria: 1-39 years old; previously healthy without severe underlying illness or immunosuppression (e.g., no AIDS, cancer, organ transplantation); hallmarks of infectious disease within 48 hours before death (i.e., fever or leukocytosis); preliminary testing, such as a blood culture, has not revealed a cause.

staff actively identify cases through a network of health professionals including public health authorities, Intensive Care Unit (ICU) nurses and physicians, infection control practitioners, infectious disease specialists, pathologists, coroners, and medical examiners. Death certificates are regularly reviewed to identify potential cases not reported by other means.

The surveillance methods used by the UNEX project for detecting and reporting unexplained fatal illnesses could be useful for detecting a bioterrorist event but are resource-intensive. As mentioned above, the UNEX project is currently being conducted in only three counties and is staffed with EIP personnel who are responsible for evaluating, reporting and responding to reports of unexplained deaths. The adoption of these methods outside of the UNEX project sites would require major commitment at the local level since all activities, including the establishment of new surveillance infrastructure for evaluating and responding to reports of suspected cases (fatal and nonfatal) would necessarily be concentrated at the local level.

Human Encephalitis Surveillance Project: Alphaviruses, including western equine encephalitis virus (WEE), eastern equine encephalitis virus (EEE) and Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus (VEE), could be employed as bioterrorist agents via infected mosquitoes or aerosol dissemination and have been categorized by the CDC as Category B (second highest priority) agents⁶. VEE, EEE, and WEE are the only alphaviruses regularly associated with encephalitis. The Human Encephalitis Project implemented by the CDHS Viral and Rickettsial Disease Laboratory (VRDL) could detect an outbreak caused by an alphavirus as it provides comprehensive diagnostic testing services that are not normally available for encephalitis cases⁷.

The overall purpose of this CDC-funded project is to better characterize encephalitis in humans (e.g., the etiologic agents, risk factors and clinical features) through enhanced diagnostic testing and epidemiology. The laboratory-testing component of the project is very resource-intensive and activities to date have been focused in sentinel health facilities. Although the project is not population-based, monitoring diagnostic testing requests for encephalitis cases could be helpful in detecting a disease outbreak (natural or otherwise).

Equine/Ratite Encephalitis Surveillance Project: The Veterinary Public Health Section (VPHS), in conjunction with CDFA, conducts the Equine/Ratite Encephalitis Surveillance Project which could be useful in detecting either a natural outbreak or a bioterrorist event. EEE, WEE, and VEE viruses are causes of viral encephalitis in

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⁶ Alphaviruses (VEE, EEE, WEE) have been categorized by the CDC as Category B (second highest priority) bioterrorist agents because they are moderately easy to disseminate; they cause moderate morbidity and mortality; and they require specific enhancements of public health diagnostic capacity and enhanced disease surveillance.

⁷ Any patient hospitalized with encephalopathy (depressed or altered level of consciousness ≥ 24 hours, lethargy, or change in personality) AND has one or more of the following: fever (T ≥ 38° C), seizure(s), focal neurologic findings, cerebrospinal fluid pleocytosis, abnormal electroencephalogram or neuroimaging study. Case patients must be ≥ 6 months of age. Severely immunocompromised patients, including HIV-infected and organ transplant patients are not eligible.

equines (horses, donkeys, mules) and ratites (ostriches, emus), although neither EEE nor VEE are known to occur in California. Equines and ratites may serve as sentinel animals because natural infections in these animals often precede human cases by approximately two weeks; likewise, animal infections following a bioterrorist event may be recognized prior to human cases. It should be noted that equine disease due to WEE and EEE are less sensitive indicators of epizootic activity because of the widespread vaccination of equines against WEE/EEE infections.

Vector-borne disease surveillance: Some of the priority bioterrorist threat agents (e.g., *Yersinia pestis*, *Francisella tularenis*, alphaviruses) are vector-borne and could be spread by the purposeful introduction of infected vector species. Thus, an efficient vector surveillance system could detect the introduction of an exotic vector species or an unusual increase in the numbers of native vector species.

The CDHS Vector-Borne Disease Section (VBDS) in cooperation with local, state and federal agencies conducts routine vector surveillance and control activities for plague and mosquito-borne diseases. Information on suspect and confirmed plague activity among humans, domestic pets, and wild animals is monitored by VBDS. The California Arbovirus Surveillance Program⁸ monitors and tests mosquitoes for arbovirus⁹ infection and implements serological monitoring of sentinel chickens for St. Louis encephalitis virus (SLE) and WEE antibodies.

Some activities that could strengthen vector surveillance in terms of bioterrorism preparedness could include cataloguing potential vector species at the local level and conducting competence studies of California species relative to the introduction of exotic pathogens.

Border Infectious Disease Surveillance Project: Release of a biological agent in southern California or Mexico could affect populations on both sides of the United States – Mexico border. The CDHS Office of Binational Border Health in collaboration with the CDC Border Infectious Disease Surveillance (BIDS) Project is establishing an active sentinel surveillance network along both sides of the border. This surveillance project will initially focus on syndromes consistent with hepatitis (A-E) and febrile exanthems (e.g., measles, rubella, dengue, and typhus). This system could include other diseases, including bioterrorist threat diseases.

Varicella deaths: A varicella death could reflect an unrecognized case of smallpox. Varicella deaths are nationally notifiable. In California, emergency amendments to the California Reporting Regulations (Title 17) became effective as of November 5, 2001 to require health care providers to immediately notify by telephone all varicella deaths to the local health jurisdiction. The emergency regulations also require the local health

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⁸The California Arbovirus Surveillance Program is conducted by CDHS, the Mosquito and Vector Control Association of California and the University of California.

⁹ Although 12 mosquito-borne viruses are known to occur in California, testing has only been done for WEE and SLE which have caused significant outbreaks of human disease. In 2000, surveillance for West Nile Virus in mosquito pools was initiated.

officer to immediately report by telephone to the CDHS all varicella deaths. Additionally, varicella death reports are monitored by the CDHS Immunization Branch through the review of death certificates.

C. CLINICAL SYNDROME REPORTING

Clinical syndrome surveillance, the reporting of clinical syndromes rather than specific diagnoses and/or laboratory-confirmed cases, has the potential for facilitating the early detection of a bioterrorist event. Clinical syndrome surveillance has been implemented in several surveillance projects in California including: 1) the California Influenza Surveillance Project; 2) an emergency department-based clinical syndrome surveillance project implemented by the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services and the CDC during the Democratic National Convention (DNC) in September 2000; and 3) a collaborative electronic laboratory and syndrome reporting pilot project implemented by CDHS and Northern California Kaiser Permanente (a region-wide health maintenance organization and diagnostic laboratory system).

Clinical syndrome surveillance is one of the methods used by the ongoing California Influenza Surveillance Project (CISP) to monitor trends in influenza-like illness and has proven to be quite useful. Clinical syndrome surveillance is also being used by the Unexplained Illnesses/Deaths Project (UNEX) to detect unexplained cases of infectious illness. (See sections A and B for descriptions of the CISP and UNEX projects.)

Emergency department-based clinical syndrome surveillance was conducted by the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services and the CDC during the Democratic National Convention (DNC) in September 2000. Clinicians were asked to provide demographic and clinical syndrome information on every patient seen at the emergency department. Data were entered by hospital personnel into a secure website and stored on a remote server. Data were monitored hourly during the day and three times each night for the occurrence of rare syndromes (e.g., botulism-like illness, encephalitis). Data were analyzed daily to assess increases in the proportions of clinical syndromes being reported. Participants concluded that clinical syndrome surveillance could be useful for a short-term, high-risk event, but that it is too resource-intensive to be used routinely.

In 1999, CDHS and Northern California Kaiser Permanente piloted a syndrome reporting project that involved the retrospective grouping of disease diagnoses (from patient records) into syndromes¹¹. (This project was different from the Los Angeles County DNC project where clinicians reported specific clinical syndromes in real time.) Both electronic laboratory and clinical syndrome data (diarrheal and sexually transmitted diseases) were submitted to CDHS for processing and evaluation.

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¹⁰ Emergency Department clinicians were asked to report patients with one of seven clinical syndromes: Upper or lower respiratory tract infection with fever; diarrhea/gastroenteritis; rash and fever; sepsis or non-traumatic shock; meningitis, encephalitis or unexplained acute encephalopathy/delirium; botulism-like syndrome; unexplained death with history of fever; OR none of the above.

¹¹ Generic gastrointestinal diagnoses and non-reportable STD-like symptom diagnoses.

Electronic and paper reporting were compared in three counties and it was found that almost 15% of the cases diagnosed by Kaiser laboratories were not identified in CDHS disease reports, probably due to lack of reporting. These findings were presented to the Northern California Communicable Disease Control Officers who were enthusiastic about the prospect of web-based reporting. A transition toward use of electronic laboratory reporting may be beneficial to laboratories, LHDs and CDHS in managing and compiling surveillance data. It should be noted that the syndromic reporting component of this type of reporting system can be quite labor intensive since it requires data extraction from patient records.

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APPENDIX G: BIOTERRORISM EPIDEMIOLOGIC PREPAREDNESS CHECKLIST

| Local Health Department Bioterrorism Epidemiologic Preparedness Checklist | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Consultation/ Confirmation | | | | | | | | | |
| Discuss bioterrorism event definitions with key public health personnel (health officer, communicable disease control staff, laboratorians, etc.) | | | | | | | | | |
| Laboratory Confirmation | | | | | | | | | |
| Identify nearest Level B laboratory [See Laboratory Section of CDHS Bioterrorism Plan] | | | | | | | | | |
| Identify point of contact (POC) at appropriate Level A and/ or Level B public health laboratory in a potential bioterrorist event [See Laboratory Section of CDHS Bioterrorism Plan] | | | | | | | | | |
| Notification | | | | | | | | | |
| Establish local notification network to be activated in case of a possible bioterrorist event; disseminate contact information and notification protocol | | | | | | | | | |
| Establish relationships with local OES and FBI contacts to be notified in a suspected bioterrorist event and maintain up-to-date contact information | | | | | | | | | |
| Coordination | | | | | | | | | |
| Establish Epidemiologic Response as a part of local Incident Command System | | | | | | | | | |
| Identify personnel available for epidemiologic investigation and perform inventory of skills and duties | | | | | | | | | |
| Establish contacts at other local health jurisdictions and CDHS to identify potential personnel resources available for epidemiologic "mutual aid" | | | | | | | | | |
| Establish contacts at the local FBI office for coordination with epidemiologic/ criminal investigation | | | | | | | | | |

| Communication |
|--|
| ☐ Identify epi investigation spokesperson and Public Information Officer (PIO) |
| ☐ Establish communication protocol to be implemented during epi investigation between PIO and epi investigation spokesperson |
| ☐ Establish a plan for rapid dissemination of information to key individuals/ institutions: FAX, Email, website on the internet (if capability exists) |
| Epidemiologic Investigation |
| A. Case Finding |
| ☐ Establish plans/ capacity to receive a large number of incoming telephone calls |
| ☐ Develop telephone intake form [See Appendix J] |
| ☐ Identify individuals available to perform telephone intake duties |
| ☐ Identify potential reporting sources (persons/ facilities) to receive case definition |
| ☐ Establish a plan for rapid dissemination of case definition to potential reporting sources |
| B. Case Interviews |
| ☐ Obtain epi-investigation syndromic questionnaires [See Appendix I] |
| ☐ Identify personnel available to conduct case interviews |
| ☐ Establish a protocol for training case interviewers |
| ☐ Obtain template outbreak disease-specific investigation questionnaires [See Appendix J] |
| C. Data Analysis |
| ☐ Obtain template database for data entry |
| ☐ Assure Epi Info software is installed on data entry computers |

| ☐ Identify personnel available for data entry | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| ☐ Identify personnel with skills to perform descriptive and analytic epidemiologic analysis | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Develop/ obtain data analysis plan | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Develop/ obtain outbreak investigation monitoring tool [See Appendix L] | | | | | | | | | |
| Contact Tracing | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Establish a system for locating contacts and familiarize personnel with contact tracing protocol(s) | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Obtain Contact Tracing Forms [See Appendix M] | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Obtain contact management algorithms for diseases that are communicable from person-to-person [See Appendix N] | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Obtain treatment/ prophylaxis guidelines [See Medical Response Section of CDHS Bioterrorism Plan] | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Develop local drug and vaccine distribution plan | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Establish a system for daily monitoring of all contacts under surveillance [See Appendix O for master record form for contacts] | | | | | | | | | |
| Public Health Recommendations | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Obtain treatment and prophylaxis recommendations for bioterrorist threat agents [See Medical Response Section of CDHS Bioterrorism Plan] | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Develop or obtain bioterrorist disease-specific fact sheets [See Medical Response Section of CDHS Bioterrorism Plan] | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Establish contact with key health care providers/ facilities and establish protocol for rapid dissemination of recommendations regarding treatment, prophylaxis, personal protective equipment, infection control, and isolation/ quarantine [See Medical Response Section of CDHS Bioterrorism Plan] | | | | | | | | | |

APPENDIX H: BIOTERRORISM EPIDEMIOLOGIC RESPONSE CHECKLIST

| Local Health Department Bioterrorism Epidemiologic Response Checklist | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Consultation / Confirmation | | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Disease scenario meets the bioterrorist event definition | | | | | | | | | | |
| Laboratory Confirmation | | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Lab specimens are en route to the local public health laboratory/ Laboratory Response Network | | | | | | | | | | |
| Notification | | | | | | | | | | |
| □ California Dept. of Health Services, Division of Communicable Disease Control (CDHS/DCDC) 510-540-2566 (regular business hours) 1-800- 590-3018 (pager for evenings, weekends, holidays) 1-510-540-2308 (security guard can contact DCDC DOD at home and/or via pager) | | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ OES Warning Center 916-262-1621 (24 hours, 365 days/year) | | | | | | | | | | |
| FBI 310-477-6565 (Los Angeles Division) 916-481-9110 (Sacramento Division) 619-565-1255 (San Diego Division) 415-553-7400 (San Francisco Division) | | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Local Health Dept. (LHD) Internal Notification Network | | | | | | | | | | |
| Coordination | | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Epi personnel identified for investigation | | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Additional epi personnel support requested (other LHD, CDHS) | | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Joint command established with CDHS | | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Investigation activities coordinated with FBI | | | | | | | | | | |

| Communication | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| ☐ Epi investigation spokesperson identified | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Communication protocol established between epi investigation spokesperson and Public Information Officer (PIO) | | | | | | | | | |
| Epidemiologic Investigation | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Hypothesis-generating interviews conducted | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Preliminary epidemiologic curve generated | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Case definition established | | | | | | | | | |
| A. Case finding | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Telephone hotline established | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Telephone intake form distributed | | | | | | | | | |
| Case definition disseminated to potential reporting sources Hospitals Physicians Laboratories EMS Coroner Media | | | | | | | | | |
| B. Case interviews | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Interviewers trained | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Uniform multi-jurisdictional outbreak investigation form(s) obtained | | | | | | | | | |
| C. Data Analysis | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Uniform multi-jurisdictional database template for data entry obtained | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Epidemiologic curve generated | | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Cases line-listed | | | | | | | | | |

| □ Case descriptive epidemiology completed • Age • Gender • Illness onset • Clinical profile • % Laboratory confirmed • Hospitalization rate • Case fatality rate • Case geographic distribution mapped (GIS mapping if available) | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Analytic epidemiology completed Disease risk factors identified Mode of transmission identified Source of transmission identified Population at continued risk identified | | | | | | | | |
| Contact Tracing | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Contact tracing forms distributed | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Health education materials available | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Contact management triage algorithm reviewed with staff | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Treatment/ prophylaxis guidelines available | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Treatment/ prophylaxis distribution plan in place | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ System in place for locating contacts | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ Tracking system in place to monitor contacts' trends/ gaps | | | | | | | | |
| Laboratory | | | | | | | | |
| ■ Establish point of contact (POC) at appropriate Level A and/ or Level B public health laboratory to refer queries regarding specimen packaging, storage and shipping guidelines in a potential bioterrorist event [See Laboratory Section of CDHS Bioterrorism Plan] | | | | | | | | |
| Public Health Recommendations | | | | | | | | |
| ☐ See Medical Response Section of the CDHS Bioterrorism Plan | | | | | | | | |

APPENDIX I: BIOTERRORISM SYNDROMIC EPIDEMIOLOGIC INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRES:

Fever/Rash, Gastrointestinal, Neurologic, and Respiratory

(See Enclosure 4 at the back of this document)

Four template syndromic epidemiologic investigation questionnaires (fever/rash, gastrointestinal, neurologic, and respiratory) have been developed for use in hypothesis-generating interviews with the initial cases in an outbreak suspicious for bioterrorism. In outbreak situations where the etiologic agent for the illness has not been identified, a broad array of exploratory clinical and exposure questions may be useful in identifying the causal agent and possible modes and locations of exposure. Using the syndromic questionnaires to interview a few of the earliest cases, investigators will explore differential diagnoses and potential modes of exposure for the illness.

Information collected from the hypothesis-generating interviews of the earliest cases will be used to create a more focused disease-specific, outbreak-specific uniform questionnaire for the epidemiologic investigation. A template database will also be developed in advance and modified at the time of the event. In a multi-jurisdictional outbreak, local and state epidemiologists will coordinate the modification of the questionnaires and databases.

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APPENDIX J: CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC) EPIDEMIOLOGIC INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRES (DISEASE-SPECIFIC)

(See Enclosure 5 at the back of this document))

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APPENDIX K: CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES (CDHS) TELEPHONE INTAKE FORM

The first part of the form includes basic information about the caller and the purpose of the call and could be completed by personnel answering the health department hotlines.

The second part of the form (the intake information section) could be administered to possible cases (or their proxies) and exposed persons by trained public health staff. The purpose of this section of the form is to facilitate the classification of persons as possible cases, possible exposed persons, possible case contacts, ill persons but unlikely cases, non-ill persons with no known exposures, or other. (This part of the form could also be used at patient referral centers to help differentiate between cases, exposed persons and the worried well.)

The definition of an exposure must be determined at the time of the event with information from the epidemiologic and criminal investigations.

Definitions for contacts vary by disease as described in Table 1.

Table 1: Contact tracing guidelines (subject to revision upon release of CDC agent-specific guidelines)

| PRIMARY PNELIMONIC | VIRAL HEMORRHAGIC |
|------------------------------|---|
| | |
| PLAGUE | FEVER (VHF) |
| A person having | A person having had |
| household, hospital or | physical contact with a |
| other close contact with | case or the body fluids of |
| persons with primary | a case within 3 weeks |
| pneumonic plague from the | after the onset of illness. |
| onset of symptoms through | |
| completion of 48 hours of | Physical contact includes |
| appropriate antibiotic | sharing the same room/ |
| therapy. | bed, caring for the patient, |
| | touching body fluids, |
| Close contact is defined as | testing patient laboratory |
| contact with a patient at | specimens. |
| less than 2 meters (6.5 ft). | |
| | household, hospital or other close contact with persons with primary pneumonic plague from the onset of symptoms through completion of 48 hours of appropriate antibiotic therapy. Close contact is defined as contact with a patient at |

^{*} It may be necessary to locate all face-to-face contacts with the case up to 17 days prior to the case's onset of fever for epidemiologic purposes (e.g., to locate all persons who might have been exposed to a common source and who may also be ill or incubating infection).

SOURCE: CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES

Possible cases could be referred directly for treatment; possible exposed persons and case contacts who are not ill could be referred for prophylactic treatment and/or vaccination; and others could be referred to information sources (e.g., information hotlines, web sites). Information about those identified as possible cases or exposed persons would be given to the epi-investigation team for immediate follow-up. Information about those identified as contacts would be given to the contact follow-up team for action.

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Telephone Intake Form

| 1. Date: | / | | ne::A | M/PM | 3.Name of | person re | ceiving call:_ | | |
|-------------------|---|--|--|---------|--|-------------|---|-------------------------|--------------|
| 4. Name | e of caller: | Last | First | | Middle | 5. Tel. N | No. of caller:(|) | |
| | b. patie c. healt d. healt e. labor f. healt g. law e h. medi | private citiz nt caretake h care prov h care facil ratory (spec h departme enforcemen a (specify: | r/friend or farider ity (specify:_ ify: ent specify:_ t (specify:_ | | | | |)) | |
| 6 k 0 | a. report b. report in iten c. report d. obtain e. return | possible ens 9-18 belong to contact to information ing a teleph | cord name a exposure to [i ow) a case (recon a about: none call fro | ord nam | e and cont | at] (record | ms 9-18 belo name and co ation in items | ntact inforn 9-18 belov | |
| 3. Action | n taken: | a. Call tra b. Mess c. Other | nsferred to: age taken/n (specify: | eeds fo | Last name llow-up cal | First | N | /liddle | _) |
| ******* 9. Nam | <u>Int</u> | | | | | ses and | Exposed I | <u>Persons</u> | ***** |
| . INGIII | | Last | | First | Mi | ddle | DOB: / mm dd | уу | |
| Hon num |) - ne phone nber | Bus |) iness phone nber | |) - Alternate p number (cellular phor | hone | 14. E-ma (if availabl | il: le) | |
| | e address: | | apt.# | city | | | county | state | zip code |
| | e of employe | | | 1 | 17. | Occupation | | | |
| 18 Work | k address: | street | | suite# | city | | county | state | zip code |

| □ fever | f illness (check all that app □ difficulty breathin | | □ abdomina | ıl pain | □ rash | |
|----------------------------|--|--------------|---|-----------------|--|----------|
| □ chills □ muscle aches | □ cough□ sputum production | nn. | □ nausea□ vomiting | | □ blurred vision□ droopy eyelid | |
| | □ coughing blood | ווע | | | □ difficulty spea | |
| | □ chest pain | | □ difficulty s | | announty open | g |
| J | ' | | , | J | | |
| | sk exposure for bioterrorist | | | | | |
| | stion at the time of investiga | | | uspected high | n-risk exposures | s, e.g., |
| | e of release, contaminated | | - | | | |
| ореспу | | | | | | |
| | t with an ill person with sym m 36; if yes, complete Item | | | | lo act) | |
| 22 Name of car | se/ill nerson: | | | 23 DOB: | 1 1 | |
| ZZ. Name or ca | se/ill person: Last | First | Middle | 20. DOD. | // mm dd yy | |
| | | | | | | |
| 24. <u>() -</u> | 25. <u>() -</u> | |) - | 27. E- | -mail: | |
| Home phone number | Business phone number | | ternate phone nu ellular phone, pag | | available) | |
| 28 | street a _l | | | | | |
| Home address: | street a | ot.# city | COL | unty | state zip code | |
| 20 | | 30 |) | | | |
| 29Name of e | employer | | Occupation | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| اد Work addr | ress: street suite# | city | CC | ounty stat | e zip code | |
| | | • | | , | | |
| 32. Date case be | ecame ill, if known:/_ | dd yy | | | | |
| 33. Type of cont | act with case: household | | ace-to-face it./ 2 meters) | other (s | pecify) | |
| 34 Date of las | t contact with case: / | 1 | 34 Duration | of contact w | vith case: | |
| 04. Date 01 143 | t contact with case:/ | dd yy | 04. Daration | i oi contact vi | ntii casc | |
| 25 Location of a | contact with cooc: | | | | | |
| 33. Lucation of C | contact with case: Street addres | | City | County | State | |
| Ol 'G' (| | | • | • | | |
| | ion and follow-up action: | r madical f | trootmont on | d to oni toor | m for intonvious | |
| | le case - case referred for le exposure - exposed p | | | | | |
| intervie | | CISOII ICICI | ned for propi | ilyiaxis aliu | to epi team ioi | |
| | l e contact to case - con | tact referre | d for prophy | axis and inf | ormation route | ed to |
| | contact management tear | | | | | |
| | nlikely to be a case - ill | | | | | |
| routed to | o epi team for evaluation | | | | | |
| | no exposures identified | | | | vebsite/hotline | ! |
| f. Other (s | specify) | | | | | |
| 27 Intomiowerf | or Itama 0.26: | | | | | |
| 37. Interviewer f | or Items 9-36: Last Name | | First | | Middle | |
| | 2331.131110 | | | | | |

APPENDIX L-1: OUTBREAK INVESTIGATION MONITORING TOOL FORM

| LINE LISTING OF CONFIRMED CLUSTERS, (Name of biological agent) OUTBREAK, Jurisdiction X – Month, Day, Year | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|------------------------------------|---|----------------|-------------|------------------------------|---|--|--|--|----------------------|--|--|
| Event/ Cluster name or ID# | Location & date cluster identified | # At risk (if known or highly suspected place of exposure identified) | # Interviewed | # Cases | # Lab- confirmed cases | RR or OR, Suspected Exposure 1 (95% CI or p value | RR or OR, Suspected Exposure 2 (95% CI or p value) | RR or OR, Suspected Exposure 3 (95% CI or p value) | Key staff contact Telephone # | Disposition of cases | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total # of | cases: | Total # of I | aboratory-conf | firmed case | s: | | | | | | | |

SOURCE: CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES

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APPENDIX L-2: OUTBREAK INVESTIGATION MONITORING TOOL FORM

OUTBREAK—DATA SUMMARY OF SUSPECT CASES & CLUSTERS—Month, Day, Year

| Case or Cluster name & location | Date notified of case or cluster (mm/dd/yy) | # At risk (if known or highly suspected venue of exposure identified) | # III | Date of illness onset, (index) case (mm/dd/yy) | # Lab- tested | Suspected Exposure 1 (# exposed/ # ill) | Suspected Exposure 2 (# exposed/ # ill) | Suspected Exposure 3 (# exposed/ # ill) | Suspected Exposure 4 (# exposed/ # ill | Key staff contact Telephone # |
|---------------------------------------|--|---|-------|--|------------------|--|--|--|---|-------------------------------------|
| | | | | | | | | | | |
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SOURCE: CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES

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APPENDIX M: CONTACT TRACING FORM: LIST OF CASE'S CONTACTS

| Date of Case Intervie | ew: | DD DD | <u>/</u> | | | | | | of Interviewenterviewer: | er: | | | _ |
|------------------------------|-----------|--------|------------------|---------------------------------|-------|------------------------------|--------------------|----------|--------------------------|---------|----------|-------|-------|
| Case ID # N | Name of C | Case: | Loot | | First | | NA: al a | | t of case illn | | <u> </u> | / | |
| Contact #1. | | | Last | | FIFST | | Midd | aie | | Month | Date(s) | Year | |
| | | | | | | 1 | 2 | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | f contact | | | | | | |
| Last name | First | | Middle | Date of last cont (MM/DD/YY) | tact | (Circle 1=Face 2=Hous | -to-face | Location | of Contact | | City | State | |
| () - | | (|) - | | (|) | | | E-mail addr | ess: | | | _ |
| Contact home phone nu | ımber | Contac | t work ph | one number | | r phone, | te phone pager) | number | (if available) | | | | |
| Contact home address | | | Apt. # | | | City | | | County | State | ZIP Cod | le | |
| Contact work address | | | Suite # | | | City | | | County | State | ZIP Cod | е | |
| Comments: | | | | | | | | | | | | | _ |
| Contact #2. | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | 1 | 2 | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | Mode o | f contact | | | | | | |
| Last name | First | | Middle | Date of last cont | tact | (Circle 1=Face 2=Hous | -to-face | Location | of Contact | | | City | State |
| <u>() </u> | | (| <u>) -</u> | | (|) | | | E-mail addr | ess: | | | |
| Contact home phone nu | ımber | Contac | t work ph | one number | | t alterna r phone, | te phone pager) | number | (if available) | | | | |
| Contact home address | | | Apt. # | | | City | | | County | State | ZIP Cod | le | - |
| Contact work address | | | Suite # | | | City | | | County | State | ZIP Code | e | - |
| Comments: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

APPENDIX M: CONTACT TRACING FORM: LIST OF CASE'S CONTACTS Case ID # Name of Case: First Middle Last Contact # 2 Last name First Middle Date of last contact Mode of contact Location of Contact City State (MM/DD/YY) (Circle one) 1=Face-to-face 2=Household E-mail address: Contact **home** phone number Contact work phone number Contact alternate phone number (if available) (cellular phone, pager) Apt. # ZIP Code Contact **home** address City County State Suite # City ZIP Code Contact work address County State Comments: Contact # Last name First Middle Date of last contact Mode of contact Location of Contact State (MM/DD/YY) (Circle one) 1=Face-to-face 2=Household E-mail address: Contact work phone number Contact **home** phone number Contact alternate phone number (if available) (cellular phone, pager) Contact **home** address Apt. # City County State ZIP Code Suite # State ZIP Code Contact work address City County Comments:

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APPENDIX M-1: INDIVIDUALS PNEUMONIC PLAGUE CONTACT* SURVEILLANCE FORM

*A plague contact is a person having household, hospital or other close (<2 meters/6.5ft) contact with persons with pneumonic plague from the onset of symptoms through completion of 48 hours of appropriate antibiotic therapy Location of contact with case _____ Case onset of illness __ / _ / _ MM _DD _YY Case ID # _____ Name of Case: ____ Middle Contact ID # Sex: Contact Last Name First Name Middle Name E-mail address: **Home** phone number **Business** phone number Alternate phone number (if available) (Cellular phone, pager) Home street address Apt. # City County ZIP Code State Occupation: Employer: Business address City County ZIP Code Suite # State

| Asses | sment | | | | S 1= | i gns and S yes, 2=no (u | Sympton nless othe | ms rwise specifi | ed) | | Drugs taken since last contact | Contact Disposition 1= fever watch | |
|---------------|---------------|-----------------------------|------------|---|----------------|---|--------------------------------|----------------------------|----------|----------------|---|--|--------------|
| Date MM/DD | Time hh/mm | Type 1=visual 2=phone | Temp °F | Fever** 1=yes (> 100.4 °F/ 38 °C) 2=no | Cough | Sputum 0=none 1=bloody 2=yellow 3=clear | Short- ness of breath | Nausea or vomiting | Diarrhea | Abdominal pain | 0=none 1=doxycycline 2=ciprofloxacin 3=chloramphenicol 4=refused prophylaxis 5=other (List all) | 2=prophylaxis 3=droplet precaution + prophylaxis 4=refer for tx 5=quarantine (List all that apply) | Contacted by |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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^{**} Contacts should receive antibiotic prophylaxis for 7 days and measure temperature twice daily for 7 days after last exposure to case. In case of temperature >100.4 or new cough, place in respiratory droplet isolation and refer for treatment with parenteral gentamicin or streptomycin.

SOURCE: CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES

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| Asses | ssment | | | | S 1= | igns and eyes, 2=no (ι | Sympto unless other | ms erwise specif | ied) | | Drugs taken since last contact | Contact Disposition 1= fever watch | |
|---------------|---------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|--|----------------|---|--------------------------------|--------------------------|----------|----------------|---|--|--------------|
| Date MM/DD | Time hh/mm | Type 1=visual 2=phone | Temp °F | Fever** 1=yes (> 100.4 °F/ 38 °C) 2=no | Cough | Sputum 0=none 1=bloody 2=yellow 3=clear | Short- ness of breath | Nausea or vomiting | Diarrhea | Abdominal pain | 0=none 1=doxycycline 2=ciprofloxacin 3=chloramphenicol 4=refused prophylaxis 5=other (List all) | 2=prophylaxis 3=droplet precaution + prophylaxis 4=refer for tx 5=quarantine (List all that apply) | Contacted by |
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^{**} Contacts should receive antibiotic prophylaxis for 7 days and measure temperature twice daily for 7 days after last exposure to case. In case of temperature >100.4 or new cough, place in respiratory droplet isolation and refer for treatment with parenteral gentamicin or streptomycin.

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APPENDIX M-2: INDIVIDUAL SMALLPOX CONTACT* SURVEILLANCE FORM

*A smallpox contact is a person who has been in the same household as the infected individual or who has been In face-to-face (< 2 meters/6.5 ft) contact with the patient after the onset of fever. Case ID # Location or contact with case City

Name of Case:

Last First Middle Date of last contact with case / City

MM DD YY Case onset of illness ____/__/ _MM _DD _YY County Contact ID # DOB: /_/_/ Sex: Contact Last Name E-mail address: Alternate phone number **Home** phone number **Business** phone number (if available) (Cellular phone, pager) Home street address State ZIP Code Apt. # City County Occupation: Employer: _____ Business address City Suite # County ZIP Code Date Vaccinated: Vaccine Lot#: **AND/OR** By: _____ Health Department Vaccinated By: Last Vaccination Drugs taken Contact **Signs and Symptoms Assessment** Since last disposition Site 1=yes, 2=no 1=no rxn contact Tem 2=redness 1=fever watch Date Time Fever** Type 3=induration 2= home Prostration Headache ٠Ē 1=yes Malaise Cough 4=papules isolation MM/D 1=visual (> hh/mm 5=ulcer 3=quarantine В D 2=phone 100.4°F/ (List all that 6=vaccine adverse rxn*** 38°C) ***Describe below apply) 2=no

**Contacts should check their temperature twice daily for 18 days after last exposure to the case. In case of temperature > 100.4°F on two consecutive readings,

SOURCE: CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES

*Vaccine adverse reaction/ Comments:

place in home isolation. If no rash develops within 5 days, contact may be released from isolation.

| A | Assessmer | nt | | | Signs | and s | Sympt 2=no | toms | | | Vaccination Site | Drugs taken Since last contact | Contact disposition | |
|---------------|---------------|-----------------------------|------------|--|-------|---------|---------------|-------------|----------|----------|---|-----------------------------------|--|--------------|
| Date MM/DD | Time hh/mm | Type 1=visual 2=phone | Temp °F | Fever** 1=yes (> 100.4°F or 38°C) 2=no | Rash | Malaise | Cough | Prostration | Headache | Backache | 2=redness 3=induration 4=papules 5=ulcer 6=vaccine adverse rxn*** ***Describe below | | 1=fever watch 2= home isolation 3=quarantine (List all that apply) | Contacted By |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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^{**}Contacts should check temperature twice daily for 18 days after last exposure to the case. In case of temperature > 100.4°F on two consecutive readings, place in home isolation. If no rash develops within 5 days, contact may be released from isolation.

***Vaccine adverse reaction/ Comments:

APPENDIX M-3: INDIVIDUAL VIRAL HEMORRHAGIC FEVER (VHF) CONTACT* SURVEILLANCE FORM

* VHF contact is a person who has had physical contact with a case or the body fluids of a case within 3 weeks after the case's onset of illness. Physical contact includes sharing the same room/bed, caring for the patient, touching body fluids, or testing patient laboratory specimens.

| | ase ID # ame of Cas | e: | | | | | Location of co | ontact with cas ontact with cas | e se / | 1 | C | ase ons | set of illnes | | //_ DD ` | |
|----------------|------------------------|---------------|-----------------------------|------------|---|--|--|------------------------------------|------------------|------|---|---------|--|-------|--------------|--|
| | ontact I | Last | | First | Middle | • | | | MM DE |) YY | :: | | | | | |
| Со | ontact Last N | Name | | First Name | | Middle | D. | OB:/_ | D YY | OCA | ·· | | | | | |
| <u>(</u> He |) ome phone | - number | | | - phone number | | | - phone number ne, pager) | | | ail address: _ ailable) | | | | | |
| | ome street ac | | | | Apt. # | City | ver: | | County | | | | State | ZIP C | Code | |
| | ısiness addı | | | | Suite # | City | | | County | | | | State | ZIP C | Code | |
| | Α | ssessme | nt | | | Siç 1=yes, 2= | gns and Syn | nptoms erwise specified | d) | | Drugs take | | Conta | | | |
| | Date MM/DD | Time hh/mm | Type 1=visual 2=phone | Temp °F | Fever** 1=yes (> 100.4 °F/ 38 °C) 2=no | Mucous r Skin Conjuncti GI systen | ined bleeding from nembranes va n (vomiting pody stool) | Extreme weakness | Maculopa rash | | since las contact 0=None 1=Ribavirin (Lassa Fever) 2=other (list a | | Disposi 1= fever watch 2= refer for and isola | or tx | Contacted by | |
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SOURCE: CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES

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
^{**}Contacts should check temperature at least twice daily for at least 3 weeks after last exposure to the case. In case of temperature > 100.4°F, hospitalize immediately in strict isolation facilities.

| • | Assessme | nt | | | Signs and Syn | nptoms rwise specified | d) | Drugs taken | Contact | |
|---------------|---------------|-----------------------------|------------|--|---|---------------------------|-----------------------|--|---|--------------|
| Date MM/DD | Time hh/mm | Type 1=visual 2=phone | Temp °F | Fever** 1=yes (> 100.4 °F/ 38 °C) 2=no | Unexplained bleeding from Mucous membranes Skin Conjunctiva GI system (vomiting blood; bloody stool) | Extreme weakness | Maculopapular rash | since last contact 0=None 1=Ribavirin (Lassa Fever) 2=other (list all) | Disposition 1= fever watch 2= refer for tx and isolation | Contacted by |
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
^{*}Contacts should check temperature at least twice daily for at least 3 weeks after last exposure to the case. In case of temperature > 100.4°F, hospitalize immediately in strict isolation facilities.

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APPENDIX N-1: PNEUMONIC PLAGUE CONTACT MANAGEMENT ALGORITHM



APPENDIX N-2: SMALLPOX CONTACT MANAGEMENT ALGORITHM




^{*} In a typical successful primary vaccination response, a red papule appears at the vaccination site after 3 days and becomes vesicular on about the fifth day. By the seventh day, it becomes whitish, umbilicated, and multilocular, containing turbid lymph and surrounded by an erythematous areola that may continue to expand for 3 more days. Regional lymphadenopathy and fever may be present. The pustule gradually dries, leaving a dark crust, which normally falls off after about 3 weeks.

A response that reaches a peak in erythema within 48 hours represents a hypersensitivity reaction and does not signify that growth of the vaccinia virus has occurred. Persons exhibiting such a reaction should be revaccinated.

A successful vaccination for those with partial immunity may manifest a gradient of responses, ranging from what appears to be a primary vaccination response, to an accelerated reaction with little more than a papule surrounded by erythema that reaches a peak between 3 and 7 days.

(Adapted from JAMA Consensus Statement: Smallpox as a Biological Weapon, Medical and Public Health Management, 1999.)

APPENDIX N-3: VIRAL HEMORRHAGIC FEVER (VHF) CONTACT MANAGEMENT ALGORITHM



APPENDIX O-1: PNEUMONIC PLAGUE CONTACT SURVEILLANCE FORM

| Today's | s Date | | | | | | | | |
|---------|--------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| А | В | С | D | E | F | G | Н | I | J |

| Cont act | Recom- mended surveill- ance period (7 days)* | Date surveill- ance begun** (mm/ dd/yy) | Last name | First name | Middle name | A g e | DOB (mm/ dd/ | S e x | Contact Disposition (Today) 1= fever watch 2=prophy 3=droplet precaution+ prophy 4=refer for tx | | Dat und | es ar ler su | nd Te Irveill | mp (° | 'F) *** | |
|-------------|---|--|-----------|------------|----------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|---|--------|------------|-----------------|------------------|-------|------------|----------|
| ID | (mm/dd/yy – mm/dd/yy) | | | | | | yy) | | 5=quarantine (List all that apply) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| exam | 04/01/01 | 04/02/0 | Smith | John | Doe | 2 | 01/01 /80 | M | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| ple | 04/08/01 | ' | | | | U | 700 | | | Α | | | | | | |
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^{*}The recommended surveillance period for a pneumonic plague contact is for 7 days following contact's last contact with a case. Record the date of contact's last contact with case, then the date 7 days after last contact (Column B).

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SOURCE: CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES

APPENDIX O-1

^{**&}quot;Surveillance begun" date is the first day the smallpox contact is successfully enrolled by public health officials to be followed for surveillance (Column C).

^{***}Record "surveillance begun" date (Column C) in the top box of column 1, then enter sequential dates to represent the full surveillance period in top box of columns 2-7. Record twice-daily temperatures in boxes under the date.

| Today | y's Date | _// | _ | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|---|--|-----------|------------|----------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|--|---|------------|-----------------|------------------|--------|------------|---|
| А | В | С | D | Е | F | G | Н | I | J | | | | | | | |
| Cont act | Recom- mended surveill- ance period (7 days)* | Date surveill- ance begun** (mm/ dd/yy) | Last name | First name | Middle name | A g e | DOB (mm/ dd/ | S e x | Contact Disposition (Today) 1= fever watch 2=prophy 3=droplet precaution+ prophy 4=refer for tx | | Dat und | es ar ler su | nd Te ırveill | emp (° | 'F) *** | |
| ID | (mm/dd/yy – mm/dd/yy) | | | | | | yy) | | 5=quarantine (List all that apply) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
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^{*}The recommended surveillance period for a pneumonic plague contact is for 7 days following contact's last contact with a case. Record the date of contact's last contact with case, then the date 7 days after last contact (Column B).

xlii APPENDIX O-1

^{***}Surveillance begun" date is the first day the smallpox contact is successfully enrolled by public health officials to be followed for surveillance (Column C).

***Record "surveillance begun" date (Column C) in the top box of column 1, then enter sequential dates to represent the full surveillance period in top box of columns 2-7. Record twice-daily temperatures in boxes under the date.

APPENDIX O-2: SMALLPOX MASTER CONTACT SURVEILLANCE FORM

| Today's | Date/ | / | | | | | | | |
|---------|-------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| А | В | С | D | Е | F | G | Н | 1 | J |

| Con- tact ID | Recom- mended surveill- ance period (17 days)* (mm/dd/yy - mm/dd/yy) | Date surveil- lance begun** (mm/dd/ yy) | Last Name | First Name | Middle Name | A g e | DOB (mm/ dd/y y) | S e x | Contact disposition (Today) 1=fever watch 2= home isolation 3=quarantine (List all that apply) | 1 | 2 | 3 | Dat | un | nder | · su | irve | eilla | | e** [*] | * 1 | | 1 4 | 1 5 | 1 6 | 1 7 |
|--------------------|--|--|-----------|---------------|----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------|---|---|---|---|-----|----|------|------|------|-------|-----|------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | | | | | | | | | | _ | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 1 0 | 1 | 1 2 | 1 3 | 1 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 7 | 1 8 | X | | X |
| | 04/01/01 | 04/05/ | Smith | John | Doe | 2 | 01/0 | M | 1 | 5 | | , | Ü | | | | | | - | | | , | | ^ | ^ | ^ |
| Ex. | - | 01 | | | | 0 | 1/80 | | | Α | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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^{*}The recommended surveillance period for a smallpox contact is for 17 days following contact's last contact with a case. Record the date of contact's last contact with case, then the date 17 days after last contact (Column B).

SOURCE: CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES

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^{**&}quot;Surveillance begun" date is the first day the smallpox contact is successfully enrolled by public health officials to be followed for surveillance (Column C).

^{***}Record "surveillance begun" date (Column C) in the top box of column 1, then enter sequential dates to represent the full surveillance period in top box of columns 2-17. Record twice-daily temperatures in boxes under the date.

| Today's | Date/ | / | | | | | | | |
|---------|-------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Α | В | С | D | Е | F | G | Н | 1 | J |

| Con- tact ID | Recom- mended surveill- ance period (17 days)* | Date surveil- lance begun** (mm/dd/ yy) | Last Name | First Name | Middle Name | A g e | DOB (mm/ dd/y | S e x | Contact disposition (Today) 1=fever watch 2= home isolation | | | | Da | ites | s an | ıd 7 | Tem urve | npe eilla | rati | ure e** | (°I | =) | | | | |
|--------------------|---|--|-----------|---------------|----------------|-------------|---------------------|-------|---|---|---|---|----|-------|------|------|-------------|--------------|------|------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|--------|---------|
| | (mm/dd/yy - mm/dd/yy) | | | | | | y) | | 3=quaran- tine (List all that apply) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 2 | 1 3 | 1 4 | 1 5 | 1 6 | 1 7 |
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^{*}The recommended surveillance period for a smallpox contact is for 17 days following contact's last contact with a case. Record the date of contact's last contact with case, then the date 17 days after last contact (Column B).

**"Surveillance begun" date is the first day the smallpox contact is successfully enrolled by public health officials to be followed for surveillance (Column C).

APPENDIX 0-2 xliv

^{***}Record "surveillance begun" date (Column C) in the top box of column 1, then enter sequential dates to represent the full surveillance period in top box of columns 2-17. Record twice-daily temperatures in boxes under the date.

APPENDIX O-3: VIRAL HEMORRHAGIC FEVER (VHF) MASTER CONTACT SURVEILLANCE FORM

| | Today's Date// | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------|--|----------------|--|-------------|--------------------|-------------|--------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----|---|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----|--------|-----------|---|
| Α | В | С | D | E | F | G | Н | I | J | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Recom- mended surveil- | Date surveil- lance | | Contact disposition (Today) Contact disposition (Today) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Con- tact | lance period (21days)* | begun* ' (mm/ dd/yy) | Last Name | First Name | Middle Name | 1= fever watch 2= refer | A g e | DOB (mm/ dd/ | S e x | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | | 1 | 1 | 1 2 | 1 | 1 4 | 1 5 | 1 6 | 1 7 | 1 8 | 1 9 | 2 | 2 |
| ID | (mm/dd/yy - mm/dd/yy) | | | | | for tx and isolation (List all that | | уу) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 04/01/01 | 04/08/ | Smith | John | Doe | apply) | 2 | 01/ | M | 8 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | X | X | Χ | Χ | X | X |
| Ex. | | 01 | | | | | 0 | 01/ | | | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 0 | 1 | 2 | | | | | | |
| | 04/22/01 | | | | | | | 80 | | Α | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - | |
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^{*}The recommended surveillance period for a VHF contact is for 21 days following contact's last contact with a case. Record the date of contact's last contact with case, then the date 21 days after last contact (Column B).

SOURCE: CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES

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^{***}Surveillance begun" date is the first day the smallpox contact is successfully enrolled by public health officials to be followed for surveillance (Column C).

^{***}Record "surveillance begun" date (Column C) in the top box of column 1, then enter sequential dates to represent the full surveillance period in top box of columns 2-21. Record twice-daily temperatures in boxes under the date.

| Α | В | С | D | Е | F | G | Н | I | J | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------|---|-------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|---|--------|--------------------|--------|---|-----|------|-------|------|------|-----|-----|------|------|---|------|---|-----|---|-----|------|------|------|------|---|
| | Recom- mended surveil- lance period | Date surveil- lance begun* | | | | Contact disposi- tion (Today) | A | DOB | S | 1 | | | | | | per | | 9 | 1 | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | 1 9 | 2 0 | 2 |
| Con- tact ID | (21days)* (mm/dd/yy – mm/dd/yy) | (mm/ dd/yy) | Last Name | First Name | Middle Name | watch 2= refer for tx and isolation (List all that apply) | g e | (mm/ dd/ yy) | e x | | | | | | | | | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 0 | 1 |
| | | | | | | арріу) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *The recor | mmondod our | sillanga nari | od for a VHF co | ntact in for 21 | daya fallay | ina contact | o loot | contact : | with a | | _ [| 2000 | and t | bo d | oto. | | nta | ot'o | loot | | 2400 | 4 | - d | | the | n th | o de | +- 0 | 14 4 | |

^{*}The recommended surveillance period for a VHF contact is for 21 days following contact's last contact with a case. Record the date of contact's last contact with case, then the date 21 days after last contact (Column B).

SOURCE: CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES

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^{**&}quot;Surveillance begun" date is the first day the smallpox contact is successfully enrolled by public health officials to be followed for surveillance (Column C).

^{***}Record "surveillance begun" date (Column C) in the top box of column 1, then enter sequential dates to represent the full surveillance period in top box of columns 2-21. Record twice-daily temperatures in boxes under the date.

APPENDIX Q: BIOTERRORISM REFERENCES (WEBSITES, DOCUMENTS, ETC.)

Bioterrorism-related web sites:

http://www.bt.cdc.gov/

CDC Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program

The Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program at the CDC is devoted to coordinating a public health response to a bioterrorist attack. This web site provides information about chemical and biological agents, press releases, training, contacts, and other important information relating to the public health aspects of bioterrorism preparedness and response.

http://www.apic.org/bioterror

APIC/CDC Bioterrorism Readiness Plan: A Template for Healthcare Facilities

Prepared by the Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology (APIC) Bioterrorism Task Force and the CDC Hospital Infections Program Bioterrorism Working Group, this document is intended to be used as a reference tool for infection control (IC) professionals and healthcare epidemiologists in the development of practical and realistic response plans for healthcare facilities in preparation for a real or suspected bioterrorist attack.

ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Publications/mmwr/RR/RR4904.pdf

Biological and Chemical Terrorism: Strategic Plan for Preparedness and Response – Recommendations of the CDC Strategic Planning Working Group *MMWR*. 2000; 49: RR-4.

Prepared by the CDC Strategic Planning Group, this strategic plan contains recommendations to reduce U.S. vulnerability to deliberate dissemination of biological or chemical agents by addressing the role of public health in preparedness planning, detection and surveillance, laboratory analysis, emergency response, and communication systems.

http://www.hopkins-biodefense.org

Johns Hopkins University Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies

The Johns Hopkins University Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies is a part of the Johns Hopkins Schools of Medicine and Public Health. The Center aims to raise consciousness and knowledge base regarding the medical and public health threats posed by biological weapons, and to foster the planning and preparation for response to possible bioterrorist attacks. This web site provides

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information and web links to academic, scientific, and governmental sites related to bioterrorism.

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol5no4/pdf/v5n4.pdf

The Journal of Emerging Infectious Diseases. 1999;5(4): 491-592.

The Journal of Emerging Infectious Diseases is a peer-reviewed journal published by the National Center for Infectious Diseases of the CDC. This volume of EID is largely devoted to issues related to biological warfare.

http://ccc.apgea.army.mil/Documents/HandbookonBioCas/Handbook.htm
US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook

Published by the USAMRIID, the purpose of this Handbook is to provide concise supplemental reading material to assist in education of biological casualty management. The handbook contains information on biological agents, diagnosis, treatment, and prophylaxis.

http://chemdef.apgea.army.mil/

USAMRICD – U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense

The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense is devoted to developing medical countermeasures to chemical warfare agents and to train medical personnel in the medical management of chemical casualties. This web site provides information about training, published materials, and links to other web sites about chemical terrorism, including a link to the Textbook of Military Medicine Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare.

http://cns.miis.edu/

Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies

The Monterey Institute is the world's largest non-governmental organization devoted to combating the spread of WMD. Web site materials, authored primarily by the Institute, are organized by geographical region, publication type, and subject (chemical and biological weapons, missiles, nuclear weapons, and treaties and regimes).

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http://www.stimson.org/cwc/index.html

The Henry L. Stimpson Center Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project

The Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project of the Henry L. Stimson Center examines the panoply of issues associated with chemical and biological weapons, including treaties for threat control and reduction, weapons destruction technologies, and export controls. This web site offers materials developed specifically for the project, and is organized by geographical region and subject.

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/he00180.pdf

West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness.

The General Accounting Office (GAO) is the investigative arm of Congress. GAO examines the use of public funds, evaluates federal programs and activities, and provides analyses, options, recommendations, and other assistance to help the Congress make effective oversight, policy, and funding decisions. This report reviews the local, state, and federal public health response to the 1999 West Nile Virus Outbreak.

http://www.mssny.org/pub_health/Emergency_Primer.htm

The Medical Society of the State of New York. Public Health Emergencies: Quick Primer for Clinicians on Detecting Public Health Emergencies.

http://www.nysemo.state.ny.us/ICS/explain.htm

The New York State Emergency Management Office

This web site contains information about the Incident Command System (I.C.S) and the Standardized Emergency Management System (S.E.M.S.).

Bioterrorism-related published works:

Alibek K, Handleman S. Biohazard. New York, NY: Random House; 1999.

Arnon SS, Schechter R, Inglesby TV, et al. Botulinum Toxin as a Biological Weapon: Medical & Public Health Management. *JAMA*. 2001;285:1059-1070.

Bioterrorism Alleging Use of Anthrax and Interim Guidelines for Management -- United States, 1998. *MMWR*. 1999; 48(04): 69-74.

Chin J, ed. Control of Communicable Diseases Manual. Washington DC: APHA; 2000.

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Christopher GW, Cieslak TJ, Pavlin JA, Eitzen EM. Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective. *JAMA*. 1997; 278: 412-417.

Fine A, Layton M. Lessons from the West Nile Viral Encephalitis Outbreak in New York City, 1999: Implications for Bioterrorism Preparedness. *Clinical Infectious Diseases*. 2001;32:277-282.

Frantz DR, Jahrling PB, Friedlander AM, et al. Clinical Recognition and Management of Patients Exposed to Biological Warfare Agents. *JAMA*. 1997; 278:399-411.

Guillemin J. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak. Berkeley: The University of California Press; 1999.

Henderson DA, Inglesby TV, Bartlett JG, et al. Smallpox as a Biological Weapon: Medical & Public Health Management. *JAMA.* 1999;281:2127-213.

Henderson DA, Inglesby TV, O'Toole T. Implications of Pandemic Influenza for Bioterrorism Response. *Clinical Infectious Diseases*. 2000;31:1409-1413.

Hoffman RE, Norton JE. Lessons learned form a full-scale bioterrorism exercise. *The Journal of Emerging Infectious Diseases*.1999; 6(6): 652-653.

Inglesby TV, Henderson DA, Bartlett JG, et al. Anthrax as a Biological Weapon: Medical & Public Health Management. *JAMA*. 1999;281:1735-1745.

Inglesby TV, Henderson DA, Bartlett JG, et al. Plague as a Biological Weapon: Medical & Public Health Management. *JAMA*. 2000;283:2281-2290

Khan AS, Morse S, Lillibridge SR. Public-health preparedness for biological terrorism in the USA. The Lancet. 2000; 356:1179-1182.

Lederberg J, ed. Biological Warfare: Limiting the Threat. Cambridge: The MIT Press; 1999.

Meselson M, Guillemin J, High-Jones M, et al. The Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979. *Science*. 1994; 266:1202-1208.

Zajtchuk R, Bellamy RF, eds. Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare. Washington DC: Office of the Surgeon General, US Department of the Army; 1997.

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State of California Documents:

The State of California Emergency Plan. Governor's Office of Emergency Services. May, 1998.

Authority and Responsibility of Local Health Officer in Emergencies and Disasters. California Department of Health Services, Emergency Preparedness Office. September 30, 1998.

The Local Planning Guidance on Terrorism Response: A Supplement to the Emergency Planning Guidance for Local Government. Governor's Office of Emergency Services. December, 1998.

The California Terrorism Response Plan: An Annex to the State Emergency Plan. Governor's Office of Emergency Services. March, 1999.

California Influenza Pandemic Response Plan. California Department of Health Services, Division of Communicable Disease Control, Immunization Branch. May, 2000.

Other bioterrorism-related documents:

Public Health Screening at U.S. Ports of Entry: A Guide for Federal Inspectors. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Division of Quarantine. March, 2000.

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APPENDIX R: LIST OF ACRONYMS

AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

BIDS Border Infectious Diseases Surveillance (CDC)

BPRP Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program (CDC)

BSERT Bioterrorism Surveillance and Epidemiologic Response Team (DISB)

BT Bioterrorism

CAHFSL California Animal Health and Food Safety Laboratory System (CDFA)

CHS California Center for Health Statistics

CCLHO California Conference of Local Health Officers

CD Communicable Disease

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CDFA California Department of Food and Agriculture

CDFG California Department of Fish and GameCDHS California Department of Health Services

CDHS DO CDHS Duty Officer

CELDAR California Electronic Laboratory Disease Alert and Reporting System

CISP California Influenza Surveillance Project

DCDC Division of Communicable Disease Control (CDHS)

DIS Disease Investigations Section (DISB)

DISB Disease Investigations and Surveillance Branch (DCDC)

DCDC DOD DCDC Duty Officer of the Day (CDHS)

DNC Democratic National Convention

EIP Emerging Infections Program

EISO Epidemic Intelligence Service Officer

ELR Electronic Laboratory Reporting

EMSA Emergency Medical Services Authority

Epi-X Epidemic Information Exchange

EPO Emergency Preparedness Office (CDHS)

ED Emergency Department

EEE Eastern Equine Encephalitis

EMS Emergency Medical Services

ER Emergency Room

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
GIS Geological Information System

HAN Health Alert Network

HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HMO Health Maintenance Organization
ICP Infection Control Practitioner

ICU Intensive Care Unit
ILI Influenza Like Illness
LHD Local Health Department

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

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LRN Laboratory Response Network

MDL Microbial Diseases Laboratory (DCDC)

MMRS Metropolitan Medical Response System (USPHS)

NEDSS National Electronic Disease Surveillance System

NETSS National Electronic Telecommunications Systems for Surveillance

OES Office of Emergency Services

OPA Office of Public Affairs
PIO Public Information Officer

POC Point of Contact

PPE Personal Protective Equipment

RHEACTS Rapid Health Electronic Alert, Communications and Training System

RRT San Diego Rapid Response Team

SLE St. Louis Encephalitis

SSS Surveillance and Statistics Section (DISB)
UCLA University of California, Los Angeles
UNEX Unexplained Illness and Death Project
USPHS United States Public Health Service
VBDS Vector-Borne Diseases Section (DISB)

VEE Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis

VHF Viral Hemorrhagic Fever

VPHS Veterinary Public Health Section (DISB)

VRDL Viral and Rickettsial Disease Laboratory (DCDC)

WEE Western Equine Encephalitis

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ENCLOSURE 4: UNSPECIFIED GASTROINTESTINAL ILLNESS Case Investigation Form

| ID NUMBER: | | INTERVIEWER: | |
|-----------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| | | AGENCY: | |
| | | DATE OF INTERVIEW:_ | |
| PERSON INTER | RVIEWED: Patient | □Other | |
| If other, | Name of person | | |
| | Telephone contact | | |
| | Describe relationship | | |
| DEMOGRAPHIC | INFORMATION | | |
| LAST NAME: | FIRS | ST NAME: | |
| | ale 🗖 Female DATE OF BI | | |
| RACE: □ W | hite ☐ Black ☐ Asian | ☐ Other, specify | □Unknown |
| ETHNICITY: | ☐ Hispanic ☐ Non-Hispanic ☐ U | Unknown | |
| HOME TELEPHO | DNE: () | | |
| WORK/OTHER T | ELEPHONE: () | | |
| HOME ADDRES | S STREET: | | |
| CITY: | STA | ATE:ZIP: | |
| EMPLOYED: □ | Yes □ No □ Unknown | | |
| | | | |
| | | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| | SCHOOL NAME: | | |
| | DL ADDRESS: STREET: | CITY: | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| | ZIP: | NELLOL BO | |
| | OPLE RESIDE IN THE SAME HOUS | | |
| LIST NAME(S). A | OF(O) AND DELATIONOLUDO (| | |
| - (-// | AGE(S), AND RELATIONSHIPS (use | e additional pages if necessary): | |
| Name | AGE(S), AND RELATIONSHIPS (use | e additional pages if necessary): | |
| | AGE(S), AND RELATIONSHIPS (use | e additional pages if necessary): | |

| CLINICAL INFORMATION (as docum | ented in ac | dmission history of me | edical record or fr | om case/proxy |
|---|--------------|------------------------|---------------------|---------------|
| interview) | | | | |
| Chief Complaint: | | | | |
| Date of illness onset:// | | | | |
| Which was experienced <u>first</u> :? | | ☐ Vomiting ☐ D | iarrhea | |
| Onset time:: | M | | | |
| Currently experiencing vomiting or dia | rrhea? | □Yes | □No | □Unknown |
| Willing to provide stool specimen? | | □Yes | □No | □Unknown |
| Date of last day of illness with vomiting | g or diarrhe | a: / / | | |
| Time of last episode of vomiting or dia | - | | | |
| Total number of days of diarrhea: | | 5/10/1 | • | |
| Total number of days of diamea. | uays | | | |
| Deiedly assessment History of present il | lmaaa. | | | |
| Briefly summarize History of present il | mess. | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS: | | | | |
| Nausea | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | |
| Vomiting | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | |
| Diarrhea | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | |
| If yes, maximum num | | • | | |
| Bloody diarrhea | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | |
| Abdominal pain/cramps | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | |
| Gas | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | |
| Loss of appetite | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | |
| Fever | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | |
| If yes, maximum temp | | | | |
| Chills | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | |
| Headache | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | |
| Muscle aches | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | |
| Fatigue | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | |
| Constipation | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | |
| Weight loss | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | |
| If yes, pounds lost: | lbs in _ | days | | |
| Other symptoms/ abnormality | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | |
| If yes, | | | | |
| describe | | | | |

PAST MEDICAL HISTORY:

| Food allergies | □Y | es | □No | □Unknown |
|---|-------------------|----------------|------|---------------------------------------|
| If yes, specify: | Y | | □No | - I Inknown |
| Diabetes Malignanov | | | □No | □Unknown □Unknown |
| Malignancy: If yes, specify type: | ΠY | 5 5 | Пио | DOTINIOWIT |
| Currently on treatment: | ПΥ | | □No | □Unknown |
| Currently pregnant | □Y | | □No | □Unknown |
| HIV Infection | □Y | | □No | □Unknown |
| Other Immunocompromising condition (e.g. | | | | |
| (| gr roman is □Y | | □No | □Unknown |
| If yes, specify disease or drug thera | | | | |
| Colitis/inflammatory bowel disease | Y | | □No | □Unknown |
| Surgery to remove part of the stomach or intestines | | 'es | □No | □Unknown |
| Other underlying condition(s): | | | | |
| Prescription medications: | | | | |
| | Yes Yes | □No □No | | □Unknown □Unknown |
| | res Yes | □No | | □Unknown |
| | res Yes | □No | | □Unknown |
| | res | □No | | □Unknown |
| | res . | □No | | □Unknown |
| Other illicit drug use | Yes | □No | | □Unknown |
| If yes, specify: | | | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| HOSPITAL INFORMATION: | | | | |
| Hospitalized? | Yes | □No | | □Unknown |
| Name of hospital: | | | | |
| Date of admission:// | Dat | e of dischar | rge: | l <u> </u> |
| Attending physician: | | | | |
| Last name: | Firs | t name: | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| Office telephone: () | Pag | er: () | | Fax: () |

DIAGNOSTIC STUDIES:

| Test | Results of tests done on | Abnormal test result at any time |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | admission (//) | (specify date mm/dd/yy) |
| Hemoglobin (Hb) | | |
| | | (/) |
| Hematocrit (HCT) | | |
| | | (/) |
| Platelet (plt) | | |
| | | (/) |
| Total white blood cell (WBC) | | |
| | | (/) |
| WBC differential: | | |
| | | (/) |
| % granulocytes (PMNs) | | |
| | | (/) |
| % bands | | |
| | | (//) |
| % lymphocytes | | |
| | | (//) |
| Blood cultures | □ positive | □ positive |
| | (specify) | (specify) |
| | □ negative | □ negative |
| | □ pending | □ pending |
| | □ not done | □ not done |
| | | (/) |
| Stool cultures | □ positive | □ positive |
| | (specify | (specify) |
| | _) □ negative | □ negative |
| | □ pending | □ pending |
| | □ not done | □ not done |
| | | (//) |
| Fecal white blood cells | □ positive | □ positive |
| | □ negative | □ negative |
| | □ pending | □ pending |
| | □ not done | □ not done |
| | | (/) |
| | | |
| | | |

| Test | Results of tests done on | Abnormal test result at any time |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| | admission (//) | (specify date mm/dd/yy) |
| Stool ova and parasite exam | □ positive | □ positive |
| | (specify) | (specify) |
| | □ negative | □ negative |
| | □ pending | □ pending |
| | □ not done | □ not done |
| | | (//) |
| Chest radiograph | □ normal | □ normal |
| | □ unilateral, | □ unilateral, lobar/consolidation |
| | lobar/consolidation | □ bilateral, lobar/consolidation |
| | □ bilateral, | □ interstitial infiltrates |
| | lobar/consolidation | □ widened mediastinum |
| | □ interstitial infiltrates | □ pleural effusion |
| | □ widened mediastinum | □ abnormal |
| | □ pleural effusion | (describe:) |
| | □ abnormal | □ not done |
| | (describe:) | |
| | □ not done | |
| Other tests | □ normal | □ normal |
| | □ abnormal | □ abnormal |
| | (describe: | (describe: |
| |) |) |
| | □ not done | □ not done |
| | | (/) |
| Other pertinent study results | | |
| (e.g., toxin assays) | | |
| | | (/) |
| | | |
| INFECTIOUS DISEASE CONSUL | Γ: □Yes | □No □Unknown |
| Date:// | | |
| · • | st Name | First Name |
| Te | elephone or beeper number (|) |

| HOSPITAL TREATMENT: | | | |
|--|--------------|-----------------|---------------------------------------|
| a. antibiotics | □Yes | □No | □Unknown |
| If yes, check all that apply: | | | |
| ☐ Amoxicillin | | □ Gentamicin | (Garamycin) |
| ☐ Ampicillin | | □ Levofloxaci | n (Levaquin) |
| ☐ Ampicillin + sulbactam (Unasyn) | | □ Metronidaz | cole (Flagyl) |
| ☐ Augmentin (amoxicillin + clavulanate |) | □ Piperacillin | + Tazobactam (Zosyn) |
| □ Cefotetan (Cefotan) | | □ Ticarcillin + | clavulanate (Timentin) |
| ☐ Cefoxitin (Mefoxin) | | ☐ Trimethapri | m-sulfamethoxazole |
| ☐ Cefotaxime (Claforan) | | (Bactrim, C | otrim, TMP/SMX) |
| ☐ Ceftazidime (Fortaz, Tazicef, Tazidim | ne) | □ Other | |
| ☐ Ceftizoxime (Cefizox) | | □ Other | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| ☐ Ceftriaxone (Rocephin) | | | |
| ☐ Cefuroxime (Ceftin) | | | |
| ☐ Ciprofloxacin (Cipro) | | | |
| ☐ Clindamycin (Cleocin) | | | |
| Did patient require intensive care? | □Yes | □No | □Unknown |
| If patient was admitted to Intensive Care Unit | t: | | |
| a. Length of stay in ICU, in days: | _ | | |
| b . Was patient on mechanical ventilation? | □Yes | □No | □Unknown |
| WORKING OR DISCHARGE DIAGNOSIS(ES) | <u>:</u> | | |
| 1) | | | |
| 2) | | | |
| 3) | | | |
| OUTCOME: | | | |
| □Recovered/discharged | | | |
| □Died | | | |
| ☐Still in hospital: ☐ improving | □ worsening | | |
| ☐ Comment | • | | |
| | | | |
| ADDITIONAL COMMENTS: | | | |

Risk Exposure Questions

The following questions pertain to the 2 week period prior to the onset of your illness/symptoms:

| Occupation (pro | ovide | e infor | mation for all jo | bs/volunt | eer dutie | s) | | |
|--|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---|------------------|---------------|--------------------|------------------------------------|---|
| 1. Please brief | ly de | scribe | e your job/ volun | teer duties | S: | | | |
| | | | contact with the Yes", specify | e public? | | | | |
| Yes N | No | Unl | our workplace ha k d approximate da | | | | | |
| Knowledge of C | Other | r Ill P | ersons | | | | | |
| 4. Do you know | of c | other p | people with simil | lar sympto | oms? Y | / N / Unk | | |
| | omp | olete t | he following que | estions) | | | | |
| Name of ill person | A g e | M/ F | Address | Phone number (s) | Date of onset | Relation to you | Did they seek medical care? Where? | Were they diagnosed by a physician? Describe. |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| 8. Have you tra Dates of Method Where I | vele Tra of T Did Y | d any vel: _ ranspo You St | ing overnight (or where in the last ortation for Travers) | two week | s? Y / N | I / Unk | _ | al residence |

| Did Anyone Travel With You? If yes, specify: Are they ill with similar symptoms? Yes □ No □ Unk □ Information for Additional Trips during the past two weeks: | If yes, specify: | |
|--|---|-------------------------|
| Are they ill with similar symptoms? Yes \square No \square Unk \square | 3 | Yes □ No □ |
| Are they ill with similar symptoms? Yes □ No □ Unk □ Information for Additional Trips during the past two weeks: | If yes, specify: | |
| Information for Additional Trips during the past two weeks: | Are they ill with similar symp | otoms? Yes □ No □ Unk □ |
| | Information for Additional Trips during the p | past two weeks: |
| | | |

Public Functions/Venues (during 2 weeks prior to symptom onset)

| Category | Yes/No/ Unknown (Y/N/U) | Description of Activity | Location of Activity | Date of Activity | Time of Activity (start, end) | Others ill? (Y/N/U) |
|---|-------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|
| 9. Sporting Event | | | | | | |
| 10. Performing Arts (ie Concert, Theater, Opera) | | | | | | |
| 11. Movie Theater | | | | | | |
| 12. Religious Gatherings | | | | | | |
| 13. Picnics | | | | | | |
| 14. Political Events (including Marches and Rallies) | | | | | | |
| 15. Meetings or Conferences (work or personal) | | | | | | |
| 16. Family Planning Clinics | | | | | | |
| 17. Government Office Building | | | | | | |
| 18. Airports | | | | | | |
| 19. Shopping Malls | | | | | | |
| 20. Gym/Workout Facilities | | | | | | |
| 21. Casinos | | | | | | |
| 22. Beaches | | | | | | |
| 23. Parks | | | | | | |
| 24. Parties (including Raves, Prom, etc) | | | | | | |
| 25. Bars/Clubs | | | | | | |
| 26. Tourist Attractions (ie Sea World, Zoo, Disneyland) | | | | | | |
| 27. Museums | | | | | | |
| 28. Street Fairs, Swap Meets, Flea Markets | | | | | | |
| 29. Carnivals/Circus | | | | | | |
| 30. Campgrounds | | | | | | |

Transportation Have you used the following types of transportation in the 2 weeks prior to onset? 31. Bus Yes \square No \square Unk \square Frequency of this type of transportation: \Box Daily \Box Weekly \Box Occasionally \Box Rarely Bus Number: _____ Origin: _____ Any connections? Yes \(\Bar{\text{No}} \(\Bar{\text{Specify: Location}} \) Bus#_____) Company Providing Transportation: Destination:_____ Yes \square No \square Unk \square 32. Train/Metro Frequency of this type of transportation: \Box Daily \Box Weekly \Box Occasionally \Box Rarely Route Number: _____ Origin:____ Any connections? Yes No (Specify: Location Route #____) Company Providing Transportation: Destination: 33. Airplane Yes \square No \square Unk \square Frequency of this type of transportation: \Box Daily \Box Weekly \Box Occasionally \Box Rarely Flight Number: Origin: Flight #_____ Any connections? Yes \(\sigma\) No \(\sigma\) (Specify: Location Flight #______) Company Providing Transportation: Destination: 34. Boat/Ferry Yes \square No \square Unk \square Frequency of this type of transportation: \Box Daily \Box Weekly \Box Occasionally \Box Rarely Ferry Number: _____ Origin:____ Company Providing Transportation: Destination: 35. Van Pool/Shuttle Yes \square No \square Unk \square Frequency of this type of transportation: \Box Daily \Box Weekly \Box Occasionally \Box Rarely

Route Number: Origin:

Company Providing Transportation:

Destination:_____

Any connections? Yes \square No \square (Specify: Location Route #

Food & Beverage

36. During the 2 weeks before your illness, did you eat at any of the following *food* establishments or private gatherings with food or beverages? (If "yes", circle establishment(s); describe below)

| Restaurant, fast-food or deli | Y/N/Unk | Grocery store or salad-bar | Y/N/Unk |
|---|-------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------|
| Cafeteria at school, hospital, other | | Plane, boat, train, other | Y/N/Unk |
| Concert, movie, other entertainment | | Gas station or 24-hr store | Y/N/Unk |
| Sporting event or snack bar | Y/N/Unk | Street-vended food | Y/N/Unk |
| Outdoor farmers market or swap me | eetY / N / Unk | Beach, park or outdoor event | Y/N/Unk |
| Dinner party, barbecue or potluck | Y/N/Unk | Other food establishment | |
| Birthday party or other celebration | Y/N/Unk | Other private gathering | Y/N/Unk |
| If "YES" for any in question #36, pr | rovide date, tim | e, location and list of food items | s consumed: |
| Date/Time: | Location: | | |
| Food/drink consumed: | | | |
| Food/drink consumed: Others also ill?: Y / N / Unk (explain | n): | | |
| If "YES" for any in question #36, pr | rovide date, tim | e, location and list of food items | s consumed: |
| Date/Time ⁻ | Location: | | |
| Food/drink consumed: | | | |
| Food/drink consumed: Others also ill?: Y / N / Unk (ex | xplain): | | |
| If "YES" for any in question #36, pr | rovide date, tim | ne, location and list of food items | s consumed: |
| Date/Time: | | | |
| Food/drink consumed: | | | |
| Others also ill?: Y / N / Unk (ex | kplain): | | |
| If "YES" for any in question #36, pr | rovide date. tim | e. location and list of food items | s consumed: |
| Date/Time: | | | |
| Food/drink consumed: | | | |
| Others also ill?: Y / N / Unk (ex | kplain): | | |
| 37. During the 2 weeks before you from? | ur illness, did y | ou consume any free food samp | les |
| Grocery store Y / N | / Unk | | |
| Race/competition Y / N | | | |
| Public gathering? Y / N | / Unk | | |
| Private gathering? Y / N | / Unk | | |
| If "YES" for any in question #34, pr Date/Time: | | | |
| Food/drink consumed: | | | |
| Others also ill? Y / N / Unk (ex | (nlain) | | |

| If" | YES" for any in question #34, provide date, time, location and list of food items consumed: |
|-------------|--|
| | Date/Time: Location (Name and Address): |
| | Food/drink consumed: Others also ill?: Y / N / Unk (explain): |
| | Culcis also III.: 1 / 14 / Olik (explain). |
| 38. | During the 2 weeks before your illness, did you consume any of the following <i>products</i> ? |
| | Vitamins Y / N / Unk Specify (Include Brand Name): |
| | Herbal remedies Y / N / Unk Specify (Include Brand Name): Diet Aids Y / N / Unk Specify (Include Brand Name): |
| | Diet Aids Y/N/Unk Specify (Include Brand Name): |
| | Nutritional Supplements Y/N/Unk Specify (Include Brand Name): |
| | Other Ingested non-food Y / N / Unk Specify (Include Brand Name): |
| 39. | During the 2 weeks before your illness, did you consume any unpasteurized products (ie milk, cheese, fruit juices)? Y/N/Unk If yes, specify name of item: Date/Time: Location (Name and Address): Others also ill?: Y / N / Unk (explain): |
| | concretions in the first contraction (explain). |
| 40. | During the 2 weeks before your illness, did you purchase food from any internet grocers? Y/N/Unk If yes, specify date / time of delivery: Store/Site: Items purchased: |
| | Tems purchased. |
| | During the 2 weeks before your illness, did you purchase any mail order food? Y/N/Unk If yes, specify date/time of delivery: Store purchased from: Items purchased: |
| | |
| | Please check the routine sources for drinking water (check all that apply): |
| | Community or Municipal \Box Well (shared) \Box Well (private family) |
| | Bottled water (Specify Brand:) □ Other (Specify:) |
| | |
| D ad | creation* |
| | |
| *Ke | ecreation is defined as non-work related activities |
| 43. | In the past two weeks, did you participate in any outdoor activities? $Y/N/Unk$ (If "yes", list all and provide location) |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| 44. | Do you recall any insect or tick bites during these outdoor activities? Y / N / Unk (If "yes", list all and provide location) |
| | |
| | |

| 45. Did you participate in other indoor occur in a private home)? Y / N / U | recreational activities (i.e. clubs, crafts, etc that do not Jnk |
|---|---|
| (List all and provide location) | |
| | |
| Vectors | |
| 46. Do you recall any insect or tick bit | es in the last 2 weeks? Y / N / Unk |
| Date(s) of bite(s): | Bitten by \square Mosquito \square Tick \square Flea \square Fly \square Other itten? |
| 47. Have you had any contact with wil Type of Animal: | d or domestic animals, including pets? Y / N / Unk Explain nature of |
| contact: | |
| Is / was the animal ill recently: Y Date / Time of contact: | // N / Unk Symptoms: Location of contact: |
| Y / N / Unk If yes, explain t | n exposed to rodents/rodent droppings in the last 2 weeks type of exposure: |
| Date/Time of exposure: | |
| Location where exposure occurred | : |

ENCLOSURE 4: UNSPECIFIED NEUROLOGIC ILLNESS OUTBREAK

Case investigation form

| | | ID NUMBER: | | | | |
|------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|----------------|-------------------|----------|--|
| | INTERVIE | WER: | | _ AGENCY: | | |
| | | | | DATE OF INTER | VIEW:/ | |
| PERSON INTE | RVIEWED: | ?Patient | ?Other | | | |
| If other, | Name of person | | | | | |
| | Telephone contact | | | | | |
| | Describe relationship _ | | | | | |
| <u>DEMOGRAPH</u> | IC INFORMATION | | | | | |
| LAST NAME: _ | | FIRS | ST NAME: | | | |
| SEX: Male | e 🗖 Female | DATE OF BIF | RTH:/ | / AGE | | |
| RACE: Whi | ite 🗖 Black | ☐ Asian | ☐ Other, | specify | □Unknown | |
| ETHNICITY: | ☐ Hispanic ☐ No | n-Hispanic □ U | Inknown | | | |
| HOME TELEPI | HONE: () | | | | | |
| WORK/OTHER | R TELEPHONE: (|) | | | | |
| HOME ADDRE | SS STREET: | | | | | |
| CITY: | | STATI | Ξ: | ZIP: | | |
| EMPLOYED: | ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Unk | nown | | | | |
| OCCUPATIO | N: | | | | | |
| WORKPLAC | E/SCHOOL NAME: | | | | | |
| WORK/SCHO | OOL ADDRESS: STRE | ET: | | CITY: | | |
| STATE: | ZIP: | | | | | |
| HOW MANY P | EOPLE RESIDE IN TH | E SAME HOUSE | HOLD? | | | |
| LIST NAME(S), | , AGE(S), AND RELAT | IONSHIPS (use a | additional pag | es if necessary): | | |
| Name | | | | | | |
| Age | | | | | | |
| Relationship | | | | | | |

| CHIEF COMPLAINT: DATE OF ILLNESS ONSET:// Briefly summarize History of Present Illness: |
|---|
| |
| Briefly summarize History of Present Illness: |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS |
| Fever |
| If yes, Maximum temperature □ °F |
| Antipyretics taken ☐Yes ☐No ☐Unknown |
| Headache ☐Yes ☐No ☐Unknown |
| Stiff neck |
| Photophobia |
| Fatigue |
| Altered mental status |
| Unconscious/unresponsive |
| Seizures |
| Sensory changes |
| Muscle weakness |
| If yes, specify: □Upper Extremities □Lower Extremities □Both |
| □Unilateral □Bilateral |
| Pattern of progression: Ascending Descending Unknown |
| Blurred or double vision |
| Difficulty swallowing ☐Yes ☐No ☐Unknown |
| Difficulty speaking ☐Yes ☐No ☐Unknown |
| Dry mouth |
| Excess salivation |
| Sore throat |
| Muscle pains |
| Nausea |
| Diarrhea |
| Vomiting ☐Yes ☐No ☐Unknown |
| Shortness of breath |
| Cough |
| Rash |
| If yes, describe: |

| PAST MEDICAL HISTORY: | | | |
|---------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| Hypertension | □Yes | □No | □Unknown |
| Diabetes | □Yes | □No | □Unknown |
| Cardiac disease | □Yes | □No | □Unknown |
| Seizures | □Yes | □No | □Unknown |
| Other neurologic condition | □Yes | □No | □Unknown |
| If yes, describe: | | | |
| Malignancy | □Yes | □No | □Unknown |
| If yes, specify type: | | | |
| Currently on treatment: | □Yes | □No | □Unknown |
| HIV infection | □Yes | □No | □Unknown |
| Currently pregnant | □Yes | □No | □Unknown |
| Other immunocompromising condit | ion (e.g., renal f | ailure, cirrhosis, | chronic steroid use) |
| | □Yes | □No | □Unknown |
| If yes, specify disease or drug | | | |
| Other underlying condition(s): | | | |
| Prescription medications: | | | |
| | | | |
| SOCIAL HISTORY: | | | |
| Current alcohol abuse: | □Yes | □No | □Unknown |
| Past alcohol abuse: | □Yes | □No | □Unknown |
| Current injection drug use | ?Yes | ?No | ?Unknown |
| Past injection drug use | ?Yes | ?No | ?Unknown |
| Current smoker | ?Yes | ?No | ?Unknown |
| Former smoker | ?Yes | ?No | ?Unknown |
| Other illicit drug use | ?Yes | ?No | ?Unknown |
| If yes, specify: | | | |
| | | | |
| HOSPITAL INFORMATION: | | | |
| HOSPITALIZED: ☐ Yes ☐ No | | | |
| NAME OF HOSPITAL: | | | |
| DATE OF ADMISSION:/_ | | | DISCHARGE/ |
| ATTENDING PHYSICIAN: | | | |
| | | FIDOT NAME. | |
| LAST NAME: | | | |
| Office Telephone: () | Pager: (|) | Fax: () |
| MEDICAL RECORD ABSTRACTION | : | | |
| | | | |
| MEDICAL RECORD NUMBER: | | | |
| HOSPITAL NAME: | | | |

| WARD/ROOM NUMBER: | | | | | | | |
|--|---------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|------------|-----------|------------------------------------|-----------------|
| ADMISSION DIAGNOSIS(E | S): 1) | | | | | | |
| | 2) | | | | | | |
| | 3) | | | | | | _ |
| PHYSICAL EXAM: | 3) | | | | | | |
| Admission Vital Signs: | | | | | | | |
| Temp: (Oral ?/ | Poetal 2 | ∘ E 2 / ∘ C 2 |) Hoart | Rate: | Pos | n Pato | B/P: / |
| . , | Nectar : | 1 :/ C: |) Healt | ixale | _ 1/69 | μ. Ναι ο . ₋ | b/F/_ |
| Neurologic examination: Meningismus (neck | stiffness): | ?P | resent | ?Abse | ent | ?Not I | Noted |
| Mental Status: | | ?N: | ormal | ?Abno | rmal | ?Not I | Noted |
| If abnormal | , level of co | nsciousness: | | | | | |
| | | ? L | ethargic. | | | | |
| | | | Inconsciou | | | | |
| Agitation: | | | Other resent | ?Abse | nt | ?Not I | Voted |
| Cranial nerve function | no. | | ormal | | | ?Not I | |
| | | : 141 | | | | | voted |
| ii abnomai, | , specity | | | | | | |
| Motor Exam: | ?Norr | nal ?Al | bnormal | ?Not N | Noted | | |
| If abnormal, describ | e: (on a sc | ale of 0/5-5/5, | less than 5 | 5/5 is wea | ık) | | |
| Left Arm | | ?Normal | ?Wea | de. | ?Not l | Notod | |
| Right Arm | | ?Normal | ?Wea | | ?Not I | | |
| Left Leg | | ?Normal | ?Wea | | ?Not I | | |
| Right Leg | | ?Normal | ?Wea | ık | ?Not l | Noted | |
| | | | | | | | |
| Reflexes: | | ?Normal | ?Abno | ormal | ?Not l | Noted | |
| If abnormal, describ | e (on a sca | le of 0-5, 0=A | bsent; 1=de | ecreased | ; 2= nori | mal; 3, 4 | , 5=increased): |
| Left Arm | | ?Absent | | eased | ?Norn | | ?Increased |
| Right Arm | | ?Absent | | eased | ?Norn | | ?Increased |
| Left Leg | | ?Absent | | eased | ?Norn | | ?Increased |
| Right Leg | | ?Absent | ?Dec | reased | ?Norn | nal | ?Increased |
| Sensory exam: | | ?Normal | ?Abno | ormal | ?Not I | Noted | |
| Respiratory status: | | ? Normal | ?Abno | ormal | ?Not I | Noted | |
| If abnormal, describe: | | | | | | | |
| Skin: | | ? Normal | ?Abno | ormal | ?Not l | Noted | |
| If rash present, desc | cribe type a | nd location: | | | | | |

DIAGNOSTIC STUDIES:

| Test | Results of tests done on | Abnormal test result at any time |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | Admission (//) | (specify date mm/dd/yy) |
| Hemoglobin (Hb) | | |
| | | (/) |
| Hematocrit (HCT) | | |
| | | (/) |
| Platelet (plt) | | |
| | | (/) |
| Total white blood cell (WBC) | | |
| | | (/) |
| WBC differential: | | |
| | | (/) |
| % granulocytes (PMNs) | | |
| | | (/) |
| % bands | | |
| | | (/) |
| % lymphocytes | | |
| | | (/) |
| | | |
| Blood cultures | ? positive | ? positive |
| | (specify) | (specify) |
| | ? negative | ? negative |
| | ? pending | ? pending |
| | ? not done | ? not done |
| | | (/) |

| Test | Results of tests done on | Abnormal test result at any time |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | Admission (//) | (specify date mm/dd/yy) |
| Botulinum toxin testingserum | ? positive | ? positive |
| | (specify) | (specify) |
| | ? negative | ? negative |
| | ? pending | ? pending |
| | ? not done | ? not done |
| | | (/) |
| | | |
| Botulinum toxin testingstool | ? positive | ? positive |
| | (specify) | (specify) |
| | ? negative | ? negative |
| | ? pending | ? pending |
| | ? not done | ? not done |
| | | (/) |
| Lumbar puncture— | ? no organisms | ? no organisms |
| cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) | ? gram positive cocci | ? gram positive cocci |
| analysis: | ? gram negative cocci | ? gram negative cocci |
| Gram stain (check all that | ? gram positive rods | ? gram positive rods |
| apply) | ? gram negative coccobacilli | ? gram negative coccobacilli |
| | ? gram negative rods | ? gram negative rods |
| | ? acid-fast bacilli | ? acid-fast bacilli |
| | ? fungal forms | ? fungal forms |
| | ? other | ? other |
| | | (/) |
| Lumbar puncture—CSF | ? positive | ? positive |
| analysis: | (specify) | (specify) |
| Bacterial culture | ? negative | ? negative |
| | ? pending | ? pending |
| | ? not done | ? not done |
| | | (/) |
| | | |

| Test | Results of tests done on | Abnormal test result at any time |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| | Admission (//) | (specify date mm/dd/yy) |
| Lumbar puncture—CSF | ? positive | ? positive |
| analysis: | (specify) | (specify) |
| Viral culture | ? negative | ? negative |
| | ? pending | ? pending |
| | ? not done | ? not done |
| | | (/) |
| Lumbar puncture—CSF | ? positive | ? positive |
| analysis: | (specify) | (specify) |
| Other culture | ? negative | ? negative |
| | ? pending | ? pending |
| | ? not done | ? not done |
| | | (/) |
| Lumbar puncture—CSF | | |
| analysis: | | |
| Other test (e.g., herpes | | (/) |
| PCR) | | |
| Please describe | | |
| Chest radiograph | ? normal | ? normal |
| | ? unilateral, lobar/consolidation | ? unilateral, lobar/consolidation |
| | ? bilateral, lobar/consolidation | ? bilateral, lobar/consolidation |
| | ? interstitial infiltrates | ? interstitial infiltrates |
| | ? widened mediastinum | ? widened mediastinum |
| | ? pleural effusion | ? pleural effusion |
| | ? other | ? other |
| | | (/) |
| CT Scan of brain | ? normal | ? normal |
| | ? abnormal | ? abnormal |
| | (describe: | (describe: |
| |)? |) ? |
| | not done | not done |
| | | (/) |

| Test | Results of tests done on | Abnormal test result at any time |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | Admission (//) | (specify date mm/dd/yy) |
| MRI Scan of brain | ? normal | ? normal |
| | ? abnormal | ? abnormal |
| | (describe: | (describe: |
| |) ? |) ? |
| | not done | not done |
| | | (/) |
| Tensilon test | ? normal | ? normal |
| | ? abnormal | ? abnormal |
| | (describe: | (describe: |
| |) ? not done |) ? not done |
| | | (/) |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| Electromyelogram (EMG) | ? normal | ? normal |
| | ? abnormal | ? abnormal |
| | (describe: | (describe: |
| |)? |)? |
| | not done | not done |
| | | (/) |
| Other pertinent study results | | |
| (e.g., toxin assays) | | (/) |
| | | |
| NEUROLOGY CONSULTED: | ?Yes ?N | o ?Unknown |
| Date of Exam:// | | |
| Name of neurologist: Las | st Name Firs | t Name |
| Telephone or beeper nun | nber () | |

| INFECTIOUS DISEASE CONS | ULT: | ?Yes | ?No | | ?Unknown |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------|------------------|-------|--------|----------|
| Date:// | | | | | |
| Name of physician: | Last Name | | First | Name _ | |
| | Telephone or be | eeper number (|) | | _ |
| H0SPITAL COURSE: | | | | | |
| INITIAL TREATMENT: | | | | | |
| a. antibiotics? | | ?Yes | ?No | | ?Unknown |
| If yes, check all that a | oply: | | | | |
| ? Ampicillin ? Cefepime (Maxipime | e) | | | | |
| ? Cefotaxime (Claforar | ٦) | | | | |
| ? Ceftazidime (Fortaz, | Tazicef, Tazidime | e) | | | |
| ? Ceftizoxime (Cefizox | () | | | | |
| ? Ceftriaxone (Roceph | in) | | | | |
| ? Chloramphenicol | | | | | |
| ? Gentamicin (Garamy | /cin) | | | | |
| ? Penicillin G | | | | | |
| ? Trimethaprim-sulfam | nethoxazole (Bactı | rim, Cotrim, TMP | /SMX) | | |
| ? Vancomycin (Vanco | cin) | | | | |
| ? other | | _ | | | |
| b. antivirals | | ?Yes | | ?No | ?Unknown |
| If yes, check all that a | oply: | | | | |
| ? Acyclovir (Zovirax) | | | | | |
| ? other | | | | | |
| c. botulinum anti-toxin | | ?Yes | | ?No | ?Unknown |
| Did patient require intensive car | re? | ?Yes | | ?No | ?Unknown |
| If patient was admitted to Int | ensive Care Unit: | | | | |
| a. Length of stay in ICU, in | | | | | |
| b . Was patient on mechanic | - | ?Yes | | ?No | ?Unknown |

| WOR | KING OR DISCHARGE DIAGNOSIS(ES): |
|------|---|
| | 1) |
| | 2) |
| | 3) |
| | |
| OUTO | COME: |
| | ?Recovered/discharged |
| | ?Died |
| | ?Still in hospital: a) improving ? b) worsening ? |
| | ? Comment |

Risk Exposure Questions

The following questions pertain to the 2 week period prior to the onset of your illness/symptoms:

| Оссі | upation (p | provide | e infor | rmation for al | l jobs/ voluni | eer duties | s) | | |
|--------------|------------------|---------------|---------|---------------------------------------|----------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------------|
| 1. I | Please brie | efly des | scribe | your job/ volu | inteer duties: | | | | |
| 2. I | Does your Yes | job inv No | | contact with the Yes", specify | - | | | | |
| 3. D | Yes | No | Unl | r workplace hak k l approximate | · | - |) | | |
| 4. Do | • | w of ot | her pe | ople with simi | | ? Y | / N / Unk | | |
| | | | 1 | following que | | D-tf | D-1-4' | D:145 | XX 7 |
| Nam perso | e of ill | A | M/ F | Address | Phone numbe | Date of onset | Relation to you | Did they seek | Were they diagnosed |
| perso | OII | g e | 1 | | r(s) | Offset | to you | medical | by a |
| | | | | | | | | care? | physician? |
| | | | | | | | | Where? | Describe. |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | vel is defir | | , | g overnight (or where in the las | 3 | | | e usual resid | ence |
| | Dates (| of Trox | رامر. | // | to / | / | | | |
| | | | | ortation for Tra | | | | | |
| | | | | ay? | | | | _ | |
| | Purpos | se of T | ravel | ? | | | | - - | |
| | Did Yo | ou Do A | Any S | ightseeing on y | our trip? | Yes N | Ю | | |
| | If yes, | specif | y: | | | | | = | 1 |

| Did | d Anyone Travel With You? | Yes | No | | |
|-------------|--|-------|--------|----|-----|
| | If yes, specify: | | | | |
| | Are they ill with similar symptom | s? | Yes | No | Unk |
| Information | n for Additional Trips during the past | two v | weeks: | | |
| | | | | | |

Public Functions/Venues (during 2 weeks prior to symptom onset)

| Category | Yes/No/ Unknown (Y/N/U) | Description of Activity | Location of Activity | Date of Activity | Time of Activity (start, end) | Others ill? |
|---|-------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|-------------|
| 9. Sporting Event | | | | | | , , |
| 10. Performing Arts (ie Concert, Theater, Opera) | | | | | | |
| 11. Movie Theater | | | | | | |
| 12. Religious Gatherings | | | | | | |
| 13. Picnics | | | | | | |
| 14. Political Events (including Marches and Rallies) | | | | | | |
| 15. Meetings or Conferences (work or personal) | | | | | | |
| 16. Family Planning Clinics | | | | | | |
| 17. Government Office Building | | | | | | |
| 18. Airports | | | | | | |
| 19. Shopping Malls | | | | | | |
| 20. Gym/Workout Facilities | | | | | | |
| 21. Casinos | | | | | | |
| 22. Beaches | | | | | | |
| 23. Parks | | | | | | |
| 24. Parties (including Raves, Prom, etc) | | | | | | |
| 25. Bars/Clubs | | | | | | |
| 26. Tourist Attractions (ie Sea World, Zoo, Disneyland) | | | | | | |
| 27. Museums | | | | | | |
| 28. Street Fairs, Swap Meets, Flea Markets | | | | | | |
| 29. Carnivals/Circus | | | | | | |
| 30. Campgrounds | | | | | | |

| 7 | r | aı | rs | po | ri | ta | ti | 01 | n |
|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|---|
| | | | | | | | | | |

Have you used the following types of transportation in the 2 weeks prior to onset?

| Frequency of this type of transport | ation: D | aily Week | • | • | |
|---|--|-----------------|---------------------------|---------------|---------|
| Any connections? Yes No | Specify: Lo | cation | Bus#_ | |) |
| Company Providing Transportatio | n: | | Destination: | | |
| | | | | | |
| Frequency of this type of transport | ation: Da | aily Weekl | • | • | |
| | | | | |) |
| | Origin: O (Specify: Location Bus# Ortation: Destination: Yes No Unk Insportation: Daily Weekly Occasionally Rarely Origin: O (Specify: Location Route # Ortation: Destination: No Unk Insportation: Destination: No Unk Insportation: Destination: O (Specify: Location Flight # Ortation: Destination: No Unk Insportation: Destination: No Unk Insportation: Destination: No Unk Insportation: Destination: Destination: No Unk Insportation: Destination: Destination: Destination: No Unk Insportation: Destination: Destination: Destination: Destination: No Unk Insportation: Destination: Destination: Destination: Destination: No Unk Insportation: Destination: Destination: Destination: Destination: Destination: Destination: Destination: Destination: Destination: | | | | |
| | ation: Da | • | - | • | |
| | | | | |) |
| | | | | | |
| Ferry Number: | ation: Da Origin | n: | | | |
| | | | | | |
| Company Providing Transportation | ansportation: Daily Weekly Occasionally Rarely Origin: No (Specify: Location Destination: Yes No Unk ansportation: Daily Weekly Occasionally Rarely Origin: No (Specify: Location Destination: No Unk ansportation: Daily Weekly Occasionally Rarely Origin: No Unk ansportation: Daily Weekly Occasionally Rarely Origin: No (Specify: Location Destination: No Unk ansportation: Daily Weekly Occasionally Rarely Origin: No Unk ansportation: Daily Weekly Occasionally Rarely Origin: No Unk Ansportation: Daily Weekly Occasionally Rarely Origin: No (Specify: Location Destination: No Unk Ansportation: Daily Weekly Occasionally Rarely Origin: No Unk Ansportation: Daily Weekly Occasionally Rarely Origin: No Unk Ansportation: Daily Weekly Occasionally Rarely Origin: No Unk Ansportation: Daily Weekly Occasionally Rarely Destination: No Unk Ansportation: Daily Weekly Occasionally Rarely Origin: No Unk Ansportation: Daily Weekly Occasionally Rarely Origin: No Unk Ansportation: Daily Weekly Occasionally Rarely Origin: No Unk Ansportation: Daily Weekly Occasionally Rarely Origin: No Unk Ansportation: Daily Weekly Occasionally Rarely Origin: No Unk Ansportation: Destination: No Unk Ansportation: Destination: No Unk Ansportation: Destination: No Unk Ansportation: Destination: No Unk Ansportation: Destination: No Unk Ansportation: Destination: No Unk Ansportation: Destination: No Unk Ansportation: Destination: No Unk Ansportation: Destination: | | | | |
| | ation: Da | • | • | | |
| | | | | |) |
| | | | | | |
| Food & Beverage 36. During the 2 weeks before your il | lness, did you | ı eat at any of | the following <i>food</i> | l establishn | nents o |
| private gatherings with food or beverestaurant, fast-food or deli | | • | | | |
| Cafeteria at school, hospital, other | | • | | | |
| carearia ai serioor, nospitar, outer | 1 / 11 / OII | K I Ianc, D | Jac, dani, Odici | 1 / 11 / OIIK | |

| Concert, movie, other entertainment | Y / N / Unk | Gas station or 24-hr store | Y / N / Unk |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------|
| Sporting event or snack bar | Y/N/Unk | | |
| Outdoor farmers market or swap me | etY/N/Unk | Beach, park or outdoor event | Y/N/Unk |
| Dinner party, barbecue or potluck | | | |
| Birthday party or other celebration | Y/N/Unk | Other private gathering Y/N | I / Unk |
| If "YES" for any in question #36, pro | vide date, time, | ocation and list of food items cons | sumed: |
| Date/Time: | Location: | | |
| Food/drink consumed: | | | |
| Others also ill?: Y / N / Unk (ex | plain): | | |
| If "YES" for any in question #36, pro | vide date, time, l | ocation and list of food items cons | sumed: |
| Date/Time: | Location: | | |
| | | | |
| Others also ill?: Y / N / Unk (ex | plain): | | |
| If "YES" for any in question #36, pro | vide date, time, l | ocation and list of food items cons | sumed: |
| Date/Time: | Location: | | |
| | | | |
| Others also ill?: Y / N / Unk (ex | plain): | | |
| | | | |
| If "YES" for any in question #36, pro | vide date, time, l | ocation and list of food items cons | sumed: |
| | | | |
| Food/drink consumed: | | | |
| Others also ill?: Y / N / Unk (ex | plain): | | |
| 37. During the 2 weeks before your | illness, did you | consume any free food samples fi | rom? |
| Grocery store Y / N | I / Unk | | |
| Race/competition Y / N | I / Unk | | |
| Public gathering? Y / N | | | |
| Private gathering? Y / N | I / Unk | | |
| If "YES" for any in question #34, pro | vide date, time, l | ocation and list of food items cons | sumed: |
| · · | | e and Address): | |
| Food/drink consumed: | ` | | |
| Others also ill?: Y / N / Unk (ex | plain): | | |
| If "YES" for any in question #34, pro | vide date, time. | ocation and list of food items cons | sumed: |
| | | e and Address): | |
| Food/drink consumed: | | | |
| Others also ill? Y / N / Unk (ex | nlain)· | | |

| 38. During the 2 wee | eks before your illness, o | did you consume any of the following <i>products</i> ? |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---|
| Vitamins | Y / N / Unk | Specify (Include Brand Name): |
| Herbal remedies | Y / N / Unk | Specify (Include Brand Name): |
| | Y/N/Unk | Specify (Include Brand Name): |
| | ments $Y/N/Unk$ | Specify (Include Brand Name): |
| = = | n-food Y/N/Unk | Specify (Include Brand Name): |
| 39. During the 2 weeks | s before your illness, die | d you consume any unpasteurized products (ie milk, cheese, |
| fruit juices)? | Y/N/Unk | If yes, specify name of item: |
| | | (Name and Address): |
| | | <u> </u> |
| If yes, specify date | / time of delivery: | id you purchase food from any internet grocers? Y/N/Unk Store/Site: |
| If yes, specify date | /time of delivery: | id you purchase any mail order food? Y/N/Unk Store purchased from: |
| 42. Please check the ro | outine sources for drink | ring water (check all that apply): |
| ? Community or Mun | icipal ? Well (sha | ared) ? Well (private family) |
| | |) ? Other (Specify:) |
| | | |
| Aerosolized water | | |
| 43. During the 2 weeks that apply): | prior to illness, did you | a consume water from any of the following sources (check a |
| | ? Streams ? | Springs ? Ponds ? Creeks ? Rivers |
| ? Sewage-contaminat | | • |
| • | rages (Prepared with water and | l sold by street vendors) |
| | | water that is not from a municipal water supply or that is not bottled or boiled) |
| ? Unpasteurized milk | . 1 | 1 11 7 |
| _ | |) |
| | | |
| If "YES" for any i | n question #43, provide | e date, time, location and type of water consumed: |
| | | n (Name and Address): |
| Type of water cor | ısumed: | |
| Others also ill?: Y | / N / Unk (explain): | |

44. During the 2 weeks prior to illness, did you engage in any of the following recreational activities

| check all that apply): |
|---|
| ? Swimming in public pools (e.g., community, municipal, hotel, motel, club, etc) ? Swimming in kiddie/wading pools ? Swimming in sewage-contaminated water ? Swimming in fresh water, lakes, ponds, creeks, rivers, springs, sea, ocean, bay (please circle) ? Wave pools ? Water parks ? Waterslides ? Surfing ? Rafting ? Boating ? Hot tubs (non-private) ? Whirlpools (non-private) ? Jacuzzis (non-private) ? Other (Specify: |
| If "YES" for any in question #44, provide date, time, location and type of activity: |
| Date/Time: Location (Name and Address): |
| Type of water consumed: |
| Others also ill?: Y / N / Unk (explain): |
| If "YES" for any in question #44, provide date, time, location and type of activity: Date/Time: Location (Name and Address): Type of water consumed: |
| Others also ill?: Y / N / Unk (explain): |
| 5. During the 2 weeks prior to illness, were you exposed to aerosolized water from any of the following ources (check all that apply): |
| Air conditioning at public places ? Respiratory devices* ? Vaporizers* |
| Humidifiers*? Misters* ? Whirlpool spas* ? Hot tubs* |
| Spa baths* ? Creek and ponds ? Decorative fountains* Other (please explain) |
| Non-private (i.e., used at hospitals, spas, salons, etc.) |
| Tion private (i.e., used at nospitalis, spas, salons, etc.) |
| If "YES" for any in question #45, provide date, time, and location of exposure to aerosolized water: |
| Date/Time: Location (Name and Address): |
| Explanation of aerosolized water: |
| Others also ill: Y / N / Unk (explain): |
| If "VEC" for any in question #45 provide data time and location of expressing to correctized vectors |
| If "YES" for any in question #45, provide date, time, and location of exposure to aerosolized water: |
| Date/Time: Location (Name and Address): |
| Explanation of aerosolized water: |
| Others also ill: Y / N / Unk (explain): |

| \mathbf{T} | | | | • | | |
|--------------|-----|-----|------|----|----|---|
| K. | eci | ro. | rı t | 10 | n | ጭ |
| 41 | | | uı | w | ıı | |

| *Recreation is defined as non-work related activities |
|--|
| 46. In the past two weeks, did you participate in any outdoor activities? Y / N / Unk (If "yes", list all and provide location) |
| |
| 47. Do you recall any insect or tick bites during these outdoor activities? Y / N / Unk (If "yes", list all and provide location) |
| 48. Did you participate in other indoor recreational activities (i.e. clubs, crafts, etc that do not occur in a private home)? Y / N / Unk (List all and provide location) |
| Vectors |
| 49. Do you recall any insect or tick bites in the last 2 weeks? Y / N / Unk Date(s) of bite(s): Bitten by Mosquito Tick Flea Fly Other: Where were you when you were bitten? |
| 50. Have you had any contact with wild or domestic animals, including pets? Y / N / Unk Type of Animal: Explain nature of contact: Is / was the animal ill recently: Y / N / Unk Symptoms: Date / Time of contact: Location of contact: |
| 51. To your knowledge, have you been exposed to rodents/rodent droppings in the last 2 weeks? Y / N / Unk If yes, explain type of exposure: Date/Time of exposure: Location where exposure occurred: |
| Location where exposure occurred. |

ENCLOSURE 4: UNSPECIFIED FEVER/RASH ILLNESS OUTBREAK Case Investigation Form

| ID NUMBER: INTERVIEWER: | | | | | |
|-------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------------------------------|
| | | | AG | ENCY: | |
| | | | DA | TE OF INTERVIE | W:/ |
| PERSON INTE | RVIEWED: | □Patient | □Other | | |
| If other, | Name of person | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | | | |
| | Telephone contact _ | | | | |
| | Describe relationshi | p | | | |
| <u>DEMOGRAPHI</u> | C INFORMATION | | | | |
| LAST NAME: _ | | FIRS | ST NAME: | | |
| SEX: ☐ Male | ☐ Female | DATE OF BII | RTH:/_ | / AGE | |
| RACE: □ White | e □ Black | □ Asian | □ Other, s | pecify | _ □Unknown |
| ETHNICITY: | ☐ Hispanic ☐ No | on-Hispanic 🛭 U | nknown | | |
| HOME TELEPH | IONE: () | | | | |
| WORK/OTHER | TELEPHONE: (|) | | | |
| HOME ADDRES | SS STREET: | | | | |
| | | | | ZIP: | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| EMPLOYED: | Yes □No □Unk | nown | | | |
| | | | | | |
| OCCUPATION: | ' | | | | |
| | E/SCHOOL NAME:_ | | | | |
| | OOL ADDRESS: STR | | | | |
| STATE: | ZIP: | | | | |
| HOW MANY PE | EOPLE RESIDE IN T | HE SAME HOUS | EHOLD? | | |
| | | | | | |
| LIST NAME(S), | AGE(S), AND RELA | ATIONSHIPS (use | additional pa | ges if necessary): | |
| Name | | | | | |
| Age | | | | | |
| Relationship | | | | | |

| CLINICAL INFORMA | ATION (as docum | ented in admiss | ion hist | ory of medical | record o | r from ca | ase/proxy | |
|--|--------------------|----------------------|----------|----------------|--------------|------------------|----------------------|--|
| interview) | | | | Š | | | , , | |
| • | - | | | | | | | |
| CHIEF COMPLAIN I | CHIEF COMPLAINT: | | | | | | | |
| DATE OF ILLNESS | ONSET:/ | / | | | | | | |
| Briefly summarize I | History of Present | Illness: | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| SIGNS AND SYMPT | OMS: | | | | | | | |
| Onset date of rash: | | | | | | | | |
| Symptoms | Present? | | | | | nt before omal)? | Rash | |
| | □Yes □No | □Unknown | | | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | |
| Fever | | n temperature _ | | | Date of | fonset: _ | | |
| OL ''' | Antipyretics take | | □No | □Unknown | | | | |
| Chills | □Yes □No | □Unknown | | | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | |
| Head ache | □Yes □No | □Unknown | | | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | |
| Malaise/fatigue | □Yes □No | □Unknown | | | □Yes | □No | Unknown | |
| Back pain | □Yes □No | □Unknown | | | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | |
| Muscle | □Yes □No | □Unknown | | | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | |
| tenderness/pain Abdominal Pain | | | | | DVaa | | | |
| | □Yes □No | □Unknown □Unknown | | | □Yes □Yes | □No | Unknown | |
| Delirium/confusion Cough | □Yes □No | Unknown | | | □Yes | □No □No | □Unknown □Unknown | |
| Cougii | □Yes □No | Unknown | | | □Yes | □No | Unknown | |
| Conjunctivitis | □Yes □No | Unknown | | | □Yes | □No | Unknown | |
| Lymphadenopathy | □Yes □No | □Unknown | | | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | |
| Bleeding | □Yes □No | □Unknown | | | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | |
| Other | □Yes □No | □Unknown | | | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | |
| Symptoms/ | Describe: | | | | Describ | | | |
| abnormality | | | | | | | | |
| PAST MEDICAL HIS | TORY. | | | | | | | |
| THE THE PROPERTY OF | | | | | | | | |
| Dermatological Cond | ition □Yes be | □No | | □Unknow | า | | | |
| • | | | | | _ | | | |
| Food or Drug Allergie If yes, describ | be | | | □Unknowi | 1 | | | |
| Diabetes | □Yes | □No | | □Unknowi | า | | | |
| Malignancy | □Yes | □No | | □Unknow | า | | | |
| Current Pregnancy | □Yes | □No | | □Unknowi | า | | | |
| HIV infection | | | | | | | | |
| Other immunocompro | | | | | | <u>.</u>) | | |
| | □Yes | . • | | Unknowı□ | | , | | |
| If was snacifi | y disease or drug | | | | | | | |
| Other underlying con | | | | | | | | |
| Caron underlying con | a.ao.ao. | | | | | | | |

| Prescription medications: | | | |
|---|-----------------|---------------------------------------|-----|
| Antibiotics in the week prior to rash ons If yes list | | | |
| SOCIAL HISTORY: | | | |
| Current alcohol abuse | □No | □Unknown | |
| Past alcohol abuse | | □Unknown | |
| Current injection drug use | | □Unknown | |
| Past injection drug use □Yes | | □Unknown | |
| Other illicit drug use | | □Unknown | |
| If yes, specify | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | |
| HOSPITAL INFORMATION | | | |
| Hospitalized? □Yes | □No | □Unknown | |
| Name of Hospital: | | | |
| ICP name: IC | CP telephone: (| | |
| Date of Admission// | Date of I | Discharge///// | |
| Name of attending physician: Last | | First | |
| Office telephone: () | Pager: () | Fax: | () |
| MEDICAL RECORD ABSTRACTION: | | | |
| MEDICAL RECORD NUMBER: | | | |
| HOSPITAL NAME: | | | |
| ROOM NUMBER: | | | |
| ADMISSION DIAGNOSIS(ES): | | | |
| 1) | | | |
| 2) | | | |
| 3) | | | |
| PHYSICAL EXAM: | | | |
| Admission Vital Signs: | | | |
| Temp (□oral / □rectal | □°F/□°C) H | leart Rate | |
| Respiratory Rate | %Oxygen satura | tion | |
| B/P / Hypotension | ⊒Yes ⊒No ⊒Un | known | |
| Level of consciousness: □Aler | | | ose |
| Skin exam: Rash | | | |
| Rash Description (check all tha | t apply): | | |
| □Papular | □Macular | □Vesicular | |
| □Petechial | □Bullous | □Erythrematous | |
| □Purpuric □Other: | □Pustules | □Scabs | |

| Rash Location (check of | off all areas of body whe | re rash is/\ | was present): | |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|
| □Face | □Chest/Abdomen | □Arms | □Legs | |
| □Neck | □Neck □Back □Hands | | □Feet | |
| □Mouth | | | | |
| | | | | |
| Did the rash develop sy □Yes | ynchronously (rash at sa □No □Unk | - | on one body area |)? |
| Order of rash spread or | n body (number boxes in ord | ler of develop | ment, more than one | box can have the same number): |
| | · 🗀 [| – | | |
| | Head Trunk | Ext | remities 🔲 | |
| Is the rash concentrate | ed in one or more areas? | [| ⊒Yes □No | □Unknown |
| If yes, where: _ | | | | |
| China avana Othan ahin ahan ata | . wia ti a a | | | |
| Skin exam: Other skin characte | ristics | | | |
| Flushing | □Yes | □No | □Unknov | wn |
| If yes, where? | | | ПОПИПОЛ | VII |
| Edema | $\Box V_{\Delta c}$ | — □No | □Unknov | vn |
| If yes where? | 2.00 | | 2011111101 | ••• |
| Jaundice | ⊒Yes | — □No | □Unknov | vn |
| danaloo | 2100 | | 20111(1101 | ••• |
| Other findings: | | | | |
| 3 | | | | |
| Lymphadenopathy | □Yes | □No | □Unknov | vn |
| Hepatomegaly | □Yes | □No | □Unknov | vn |
| Conjunctivitis | □Yes | □No | □Unknov | vn |
| Pharyngeal inflammation | on □Yes | □No | □Unknov | vn |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| Other abnormal physical finding | gs (describe): | | | ···· |
| | | | | |
| DIAGNOSTIC STUDIES: | | | | |
| | | | | |
| Test | Results of tests do | one on | Abnormal te | st result at any time |
| | | | | |
| | admission (/_ | _/) | (specify | date mm/dd/yy) |
| Hemoglobin (Hb) | | | | |
| | | | (/ / | ` |
| | | | | _/ |
| Hematocrit (HCT) | | | | |
| | | | (// | ` |
| | | | \ | / |
| Platelet (plt) | | | | |
| | Thrombocytopenia? | | (/ / |) |
| | □Yes □No □Unk | nown | | |
| | | | Thrombocytope | |
| | | | □Yes □No | □Unknown |
| Prothrombin time (PT) | | | | |
| | | | | , |
| | | | (// | _) |
| Partial thromboplastin time | | | | |
| · (PTT) | | | (, , | , |
| | • | | | |

| Test | Results of tests done on | Abnormal test result at any time | | |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|--|--|
| | admission (//) | (specify date mm/dd/yy) | | |
| | | | | |
| Total white blood cell (WBC) | | | | |
| | | (//) | | |
| | | | | |
| WBC differential: | | (//) | | |
| % granulocytes (PMNs) | | | | |
| | | (/) | | |
| % bands | | | | |
| | | (/) | | |
| % lymphocytes | | | | |
| | | (/) | | |
| Bacterial Blood cultures | □ positive | □ positive | | |
| | (specify) | (specify) | | |
| | ☐ negative | ☐ negative | | |
| | □ pending | ☐ pending | | |
| | ☐ not done | ☐ not done | | |
| | | (/) | | |
| Viral Blood Cultures | □ positive | □ positive | | |
| | (specify | (specify) | | |
| |) ☐ negative | ☐ negative | | |
| | □ pending | □ pending | | |
| | ☐ not done | ☐ not done | | |
| | | (/) | | |
| Viral Isolation Culture of | ☐ positive | ☐ positive | | |
| lesion | (specify) | (specify) | | |
| | ☐ negative | ☐ negative | | |
| | □ pending | □ pending | | |
| | ☐ not done | ☐ not done | | |
| | | (/) | | |
| Tzank smear | ☐ positive | ☐ positive | | |
| | □ negative | □ negative | | |
| | □ pending | □ pending | | |
| | □ not done | □ not done | | |
| | | (/) | | |
| | | | | |

| Test | Results of tests done on | Abnormal test result at any time | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|--|
| | admission (//) | (specify date mm/dd/yy) | | |
| | | | | |
| Lesion scraping/biopsy | □ positive | □ positive | | |
| | (specify) | (specify) | | |
| | ☐ negative | □ negative | | |
| | □ pending | □ pending | | |
| | ☐ not done | ☐ not done | | |
| | | (/) | | |
| Urinalysis | □ positive | □ positive | | |
| | (specify) | (specify) | | |
| | ☐ negative | ☐ negative | | |
| | □ pending | □ pending | | |
| | ☐ not done | ☐ not done | | |
| | | (//) | | |
| Hematuria | ☐ positive | ☐ positive | | |
| | ☐ negative | ☐ negative | | |
| | □ pending | □ pending | | |
| | ☐ unknown | □ unknown | | |
| Renal function: BUN/Cr | | | | |
| | | (//) | | |
| Liver Enzymes: AST/ALT | | | | |
| | | (//) | | |
| Chest radiograph | ☐ normal | □ normal | | |
| | unilateral, lobar/consolidation | ☐ unilateral, lobar/consolidation | | |
| | ☐ bilateral, lobar/consolidation | ☐ bilateral, lobar/consolidation | | |
| | ☐ interstitial infiltrates | ☐ interstitial infiltrates | | |
| | ☐ widened mediastinum | ☐ widened mediastinum | | |
| | ☐ pleural effusion | □ pleural effusion | | |
| | □ other | □ other | | |
| | | (//) | | |
| Other pertinent study results | | | | |
| | | (//) | | |
| | | | | |

| INFEC | TIOUS DISEASE | CONSULT: | □Yes | □No | □Unknown |
|---------------------|---|---|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|
| | Date://_ | | | | |
| | Name of physici | an: Last | | First | |
| | | Telephone o | r beeper number (|) | · |
| HOSPI | TAL TREATMEN | IT: | | | |
| a) | | □Yes List antibiotics taken: | | □Unknowr | |
| b) | Antivirals If yes, | □Yes Acyclovir (Zovirax) List other antivirals ta | □No □Yes □No | □Unknowr □Unknowr | 1 1 |
| | If yes, how soon tient require inten | | □immedia □Yes | | teshoursdays |
| WORK | ING OR DISCHA | RGE DIAGNOSIS(E | S): | | |
| 1) 2) | | | <u></u> | | |
| □Died Still in h | vered/discharged | l ving□ b) worsening□ | | | |

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:

Risk Exposure Questions

The following questions pertain to the 2 week period prior to the onset of your illness/symptoms:

| Occupation | (provid | e info | rmation for all | jobs/ volun | teer duti | ies) | | |
|--------------------|----------------------|----------------|--|------------------|-----------------|--------------------|--|---|
| 1. Please br | riefly de | scribe | e your job/ volu | nteer duties | : | | | |
| | | | e contact with the Yes", specify_ | | | | | |
| Yes | No | Un | our workplace h k d approximate o | | | | | |
| - | now of c | other 1 | <i>Dersons</i> beople with sim he following qu | | ms? Y | ' / N / Unk | | |
| Name of ill person | A g e | M/ F | Address | Phone number (s) | Date of onset | Relation to you | Did they seek medical care? Where? | Were they diagnosed by a physician? Describe. |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | ing overnight (c | | | | han the usua | l residence |
| Dates | s of Tra | vel: | where in the las | to / | / | | | |
| When | ioa ot 1 re Did Y | ransp Zou S | ortation for Tra | vei: | | | | |
| i uipi | 050 01 1 | ravci | <u>-</u> | | | | | |
| Did Y If yes | y ou Do s, specif | Any i | Sightseeing on | your trip? | Yes □ N | NO U | | |
| Did A | II yes | s, spec | el With You? | | | | | |
| | Are t | hey il | l with similar sy | ymptoms? | $Yes \square N$ | No 🗆 Unk | | |

California Department of Health Services (CDHS) Bioterrorism Surveillance and Epidemiologic Response Plan

Public Functions/Venues (during 2 weeks prior to symptom onset)

| Category | Yes/No/ | Description of | Location of | Date of | Time of | Others ill? |
|---|--------------------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------------------|-------------|
| | Unknown (Y/N/U) | Activity | Activity | Activity | Activity (start, end) | (Y/N/U) |
| 9. Sporting Event | | | | | | |
| 10. Performing Arts (ie Concert, Theater, Opera) | | | | | | |
| 11. Movie Theater | | | | | | |
| 12. Religious Gatherings | | | | | | |
| 13. Picnics | | | | | | |
| 14. Political Events (including Marches and Rallies) | | | | | | |
| 15. Meetings or Conferences (work or personal) | | | | | | |
| 16. Family Planning Clinics | | | | | | |
| 17. Government Office Building | | | | | | |
| 18. Airports | | | | | | |
| 19. Shopping Malls | | | | | | |
| 20. Gym/Workout Facilities | | | | | | |
| 21. Casinos | | | | | | |
| 22. Beaches | | | | | | |
| 23. Parks | | | | | | |
| 24. Parties (including Raves, Prom, etc) | | | | | | |
| 25. Bars/Clubs | | | | | | |
| 26. Tourist Attractions (ie Sea World, Zoo, Disneyland) | | | | | | |
| 27. Museums | | | | | | |
| 28. Street Fairs, Swap Meets, Flea Markets | | | | | | |
| 29. Carnivals/Circus | | | | | | |
| 30. Campgrounds | | | | | | |

*Transportation*Have you used the following types of transportation in the 2 weeks prior to onset?

| 31. Bus | Yes \square No \square | Unk \square | | | |
|---|---------------------------------|--------------------|----------|----------------|------------------|
| Frequency of this type Bus Number: | | Origin: | | | |
| Any connections? Yes | □ No □ (Specify | : Location | | Bus# | |
| Company Providing T Destination: | ransportation: | | | - | |
| 32. Train/Metro | Yes □ No □ | Unk □ | | | |
| Frequency of this type Route Number: | | rigin: | _ | • | - |
| Any connections? Yes | \square No \square (Specify | : Location | | Route # |) |
| Company Providing T Destination: | ransportation: | | | | |
| 33. Airplane Ye | s 🗆 No 🗆 Unk 🗆 | | | | |
| Frequency of this type Flight Number: Any connections? Yes | of transportation: | □ Daily Drigin: | □ Weekly | ☐ Occasionally | ☐ Rarely |
| Any connections? Yes | \square No \square (Specify | : Location | | Flight # |) |
| Company Providing T Destination: | ransportation: | | | <u></u> | |
| 34. Boat/Ferry Ye | s □ No □ Unk □ | | | | |
| Frequency of this type Ferry Number: | 0 | rigin: | _ | • | - |
| Any connections? Yes Company Providing T Destination: | ☐ No ☐ (Specify ransportation: | : Location | | Ferry # |) |
| 35. Van Pool/Shuttle Ye | s □ No □ Unk □ |] | | | |
| Frequency of this type | of transportation: | □ Daily | □ Weekly | ☐ Occasionally | \square Rarely |
| Route Number: | | rigin: | | | |
| Any connections? Yes | \square No \square (Specify | : Location | | Route # |) |
| Company Providing T | ransporation: | | | | |
| Destination: | | | | | |

Food & Beverage

36. During the 2 weeks before your illness, did you eat at any of the following *food establishments or private gatherings with food or beverages*? (If "yes", circle establishment(s); describe below)

| Cafeteria at school, hospital, other | | Grocery store or salad-bar Plane, boat, train, other | Y / N / Unk Y / N / Unk |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------|---|----------------------------|
| Concert, movie, other entertainm | | Gas station or 24-hr store | Y/N/Unk |
| Sporting event of shaek our | Y/N/Unk | Street-vended food | Y/N/Unk |
| Outdoor farmers market or swap | | Beach, park or outdoor event | |
| Dinner party, barbecue or potluc | | | Y/N/Unk |
| Birthday party or other celebration | on Y/N/Unk | Other private gathering | Y / N / Unk |
| If "YES" for any in question #36 | , provide date, tim | ne, location and list of food items | s consumed: |
| Date/Time: | Location: | | |
| Food/drink consumed: | · | | |
| Others also ill?: Y / N / Unk | (explain): | | |
| If "YES" for any in question #36 | 5, provide date, tim | ne, location and list of food items | s consumed: |
| | | , | |
| Food/drink consumed: | | | |
| Others also ill?: Y / N / Unk | (explain): | | |
| If "YES" for any in question #36 | nrovide date tim | ne location and list of food items | s consumed: |
| | _ | ic, location and list of food items | |
| Food/drink consumed: | Location | | |
| Others also ill?: Y / N / Unk | (explain): | | |
| If "YES" for any in question #36 | | | |
| | | ic, location and list of food items | |
| Food/drink consumed: | | | |
| Others also ill? V / N / Unk | (evnlain): | | |
| Others also III. 17107 Olik | (схрішіі). | | |
| 37. During the 2 weeks before | your illness, did y | ou consume any free food sample | les |
| from? | | | |
| Grocery store Y | / N / Unk | | |
| 3 | /N/Unk | | |
| | / N / Unk | | |
| | / N / Unk | | |
| If "YES" for any in question #34 | l, provide date, tim | ne, location and list of food items | s consumed: |
| | | ne and Address): | |
| | | | |
| Others also ill?: Y / N / Unk | (explain): | | |

| If "YES" for any in question #34, provide date, time, location and list of food items consumed: Date/Time: Location (Name and Address): | |
|---|---|
| Food/drink consumed: Others also ill?: Y / N / Unk (explain): | _ |
| Others also ill?: Y / N / Unk (explain): | |
| 38. During the 2 weeks before your illness, did you consume any of the following <i>products</i> ? | |
| Vitamins Y / N / Unk Specify (Include Brand Name): | _ |
| Herbal remedies Y / N / Unk Specify (Include Brand Name): | _ |
| Diet Aids Y/N/Unk Specify (Include Brand Name): | _ |
| Nutritional Supplements Y/N/Unk Specify (Include Brand Name): | _ |
| Other Ingested non-food Y / N / Unk Specify (Include Brand Name): | - |
| 39. During the 2 weeks before your illness, did you consume any unpasteurized products (ie milk, cheese, fruit juices)? Y/N/Unk If yes, specify name of item: Date/Time: Location (Name and Address): | |
| Others also ill?: Y / N / Unk (explain): | |
| 40 . During the 2 weeks before your illness, did you purchase food from any internet grocers? Y/N/Unk | |
| If yes, specify date / time of delivery: Store/Site: Items purchased: | _ |
| 41. During the 2 weeks before your illness, did you purchase any mail order food? Y/N/Unk If yes, specify date/time of delivery: Store purchased from: Items purchased: | _ |
| 42. Please check the routine sources for drinking water (check all that apply): | |
| □ Community or Municipal □ Well (shared) □ Well (private family) | |
| □ Bottled water (Specify Brand:) □ Other (Specify: |) |
| bottled water (Speerly Braild | J |
| Recreation* | |
| *Recreation is defined as non-work related activities | |
| 43. In the past two weeks, did you participate in any outdoor activities? Y/N/Unk (If "yes", list all and provide location) | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| 44. Do you recall any insect or tick bites during these outdoor activities? Y $/$ N $/$ Unk (If "yes", list all and provide location) | |
| | |
| | |

| occur in a private home)? Y / N / Unk (List all and provide location) | clubs, craits, etc that do not |
|--|--------------------------------|
| Vectors | |
| 46. Do you recall any insect or tick bites in the last 2 weeks? | Y / N / Unk |
| Date(s) of bite(s): Bitten by □ Mosquito | |
| Other: | |
| Where were you when you were bitten? | |
| 47. Have you had any contact with wild or domestic animals, incl Type of Animal: Explain nature of | f contact: |
| Is / was the animal ill recently: Y/N/Unk Symptoms:_ | |
| Date / Time of contact: Location of con | ntact: |
| 48. To your knowledge, have you been exposed to rodents/rodent Y / N / Unk If yes, explain type of exposure: | |
| Date/Time of exposure: Location where exposure occurred: | |

ENCLOSURE 4: UNSPECIFIED RESPIRATORY ILLNESS OUTBREAK Case Investigation Form

| ID NUMBER:_ | | | | | |
|--------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------|------------|-------------|
| | | | INTERVIEV | VER: | |
| | | | AGENCY:_ | | |
| | | | DATE OFN | TERVIEW:/_ | / |
| PERSON INTE | RVIEWED: □Pat | tient □Other | | | |
| If other, | Name of person | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | | _ | |
| | Telephone contact | <u> </u> | | | |
| | Describe relationship | | | _ | |
| DEMOGRAPH | IC INFORMATION | | | | |
| LAST NAME: _ | | FIRST NAME: _ | | | _ |
| SEX: Male | □ Female DATE | E OF BIRTH: | / | AGE | |
| RACE: □ Whit | e□ Black □ Asian | □ Other, specify | / | _ Unknown | |
| ETHNICITY: | ☐ Hispanic ☐ Non-Hispani | ic 🗆 Unknown | | | |
| HOME TELEPH | HONE: () | | | | |
| WORK/OTHER | R TELEPHONE: () | | | | |
| HOME ADDRE | SS STREET: | | _ | | |
| CITY: | | _ STATE: | | ZIP: | |
| EMPLOYED: | □ Yes □ No □ Unknown | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | <u>:</u> | | | | |
| | E/SCHOOL NAME: | | | | |
| | OOL ADDRESS: STREET: | | CIT | Y: | |
| | ZIP: | | | | |
| | EOPLE RESIDE IN THE SAME | _ | | | |
| LIST NAME(S) | , AGE(S), AND RELATIONSHI | IPS (use additional | pages if nec | essary): | |
| Name | | | | | |
| Age | | | | | |
| Relationship | | | | | |

| <u>CLINICAL INFORMATION</u> (as doci interview) | umenteu in aumis | Sion mistory or m | ledical record of fic | ili case/proxy | | | |
|--|------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|----------------|--|--|--|
| CHIEF COMPLAINT: | | | | | | | |
| DATE OF ILLNESS ONSET: // | | | | | | | |
| Briefly summarize History of Prese | | | | | | | |
| bliefly sufficiency of Fresh | ent illiess | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS: | | | | | | | |
| | □Voo | □No | | | | | |
| Cough | □Yes □Yes | □No | □Unknown | | | | |
| If yes, sputum production? | | □No | □Unknown | | | | |
| If yes, any blood? | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | | | | |
| Chest pain Shortness of breath | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | | | | |
| | □Yes □Yes | □No □No | □Unknown □Unknown | | | | |
| Stridor/wheezing Cyanosis | □ Yes | □No | □Unknown | | | | |
| Conjunctivitis | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | | | | |
| Tender/enlarged glands | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| Fever | □ Yes | □ No | ☐ Unknown | | | | |
| If yes, maximum temperatu | | □ °C | | | | | |
| Antipyretics taken: | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | | | | |
| Headache | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | | | | |
| Muscle aches | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | | | | |
| Fatigue | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | | | | |
| Joint pains Stiff neck | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | | | | |
| | □Yes | □No | □Unknown □Unknown | | | | |
| Altered mental status | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | | | | |
| Unconscious/unresponsive | □Yes | □No | | | | | |
| Nausea | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | | | | |
| Vomiting | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | | | | |
| Diarrhea | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | | | | |
| Abdominal pain | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | | | | |
| Rash | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | | | | |
| If yes, describe: | | | | | | | |
| Other symptom/abnormality: | | | | | | | |
| Did patient appear to improve and | I then relapse? | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | | | |
| PAST MEDICAL HISTORY: | | | | | | | |
| Diabetes | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | | | | |
| Cardiac disease | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | | | | |
| Pulmonary disease | □Yes | □No | □Unknown | | | | |

| If yes, | | | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------------|--------------|
| describe: | | | | |
| Malignancy | □Yes | □No | □Unknowi | า |
| If yes, specify type: | | | | |
| Currently on treatment: | □Yes | □No | □Unknowi | า |
| Currently pregnant | □Yes | □No | □Unknowi | |
| HIV infection | □Yes | □No | □Unknowi | |
| Other immunocompromising cond | , • | | | • |
| | □Yes | □No | □Unknowi | |
| If yes, specify disease or dr | ug therapy: | | | |
| Other underlying condition(s): | | | | |
| Prescription Medications: | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| SOCIAL HISTORY: | | | | |
| Current alcohol abuse | Г | Yes | □No □□ | Unknown |
| Past alcohol abuse | | | | Unknown |
| Current injection drug use | | | | Unknown |
| Past injection drug use | | | | Unknown |
| Current smoker | | Yes | □No □□ | Unknown |
| Former smoker | | Yes | □No □□ | Unknown |
| Other illicit drug use | | Yes | □No □ | Unknown |
| If yes, | | | | |
| specify: | | | | |
| | | | | |
| HOSPITAL INFORMATION: | | | | |
| HOSPITALIZED ☐ Yes ☐ No | | | | |
| NAME OF HOSPITAL: | | | | |
| DATE OF ADMISSION/_ | | | F DISCHARGE _ | 1 1 |
| DATE OF ADMISSION/ | | DATEO | DISCHARGE _ | |
| | | | | |
| NAME OF ATTENDING PHYSICIAI | | | | |
| Office Telephone: () | P | ager: () | Fa | x: () |
| | | | | |
| MEDICAL RECORD ABSTRACTIO | N: | | | |
| MEDICAL RECORD NUMBER: | | | | |
| | | | | |
| HOSPITAL NAME: | | | | |
| ROOM NUMBER: | | | | |
| ADMISSION DIAGNOSIS(ES): 1) | | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | _ |
| 3) | | | | |

| PHYSICAL EXAM: | | | | |
|--|-----------------------|--------------|----------|---------------------------|
| Admission Vital Signs: | | | | |
| Temp (□oral / □rec | tal □ °F / □ °C) | Heart Rate | B/P | |
| Resp. Rate | %Oxygen saturation | | | |
| Mental Status: If abnormal, describe: | | al □Abn | | |
| Respiratory status: | □Normal spontaneous | □Respiratory | distress | □Ventilatory support |
| If abnormal, check all tha □ rales □ other (specify: | ☐ decreased or absent | | | |
| Skin: | □Norm | ıal □Abn | ormal | □Not Noted |
| If abnormal, check all tha | at apply: | | | |
| □ edema | □ chest wall edema | □ cyanosis | □ eryth | ema |
| □ sloughing/nec | rosis rash | □ petechiae | □ purpu | ıra |
| If rash present, describe | type and location: | | | |
| Other abnormal physical findings | (describe): | | | |
| DIAGNOSTIC STUDIES: | | | | |
| Test | Results of tests | done on | Abnorma | al test result at any tim |
| | admission (/ | , , | 1000 | oifu data mm/dd/\n\ |

| Test | Results of tests done on admission (//) | Abnormal test result at any time (specify date mm/dd/yy) |
|------------------------------|---|--|
| Hemoglobin (Hb) | | (opcony data minadayy) |
| | | (/) |
| Hematocrit (HCT) | | |
| | | (//) |
| Platelet (plt) | | |
| | | (//) |
| Prothrombin time (PT) | | |
| | | (//) |
| Partial thromboplastin time | | |
| (PTT) | | (//) |
| Total white blood cell (WBC) | | |
| | | (/) |
| WBC differential: | | |

| Test | Results of tests done on | Abnormal test result at any time | | |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|--|
| | admission (//) | (specify date mm/dd/yy) | | |
| | | (//) | | |
| % granulocytes (PMNs) | | (//) | | |
| % bands | | (/) | | |
| % lymphocytes | | (//) | | |
| Renal function: BUN/Cr | | (//) | | |
| Liver enzymes: AST/ALT | | (/) | | |
| Blood cultures | □ positive | □ positive | | |
| | (specify) | (specify) | | |
| | □ negative | □ negative | | |
| | □ pending | □ pending | | |
| | □ not done | □ not done | | |
| | | (/) | | |
| Respiratory secretions: | □ expectorated sputum | □ expectorated sputum | | |
| specimen type | □ induced sputum | □ induced sputum | | |
| | □ bronchial alveolar lavage (BAL) | □ bronchial alveolar lavage (BAL) | | |
| | □ tracheal aspirate | □ tracheal aspirate | | |
| | | (/) | | |
| Respiratory secretions: | □ PMNs | □ PMNs | | |
| Gram stain (check all that | □ epithelial cells | □ epithelial cells | | |
| apply) | ☐ gram positive cocci | ☐ gram positive cocci | | |
| | □ gram negative cocci | □ gram negative cocci | | |
| | □ gram positive rods | ☐ gram positive rods | | |
| | □ gram negative coccobacilli | □ gram negative coccobacilli | | |
| | □ gram negative bipolar | □ gram negative bipolar | | |
| | staining/safety pin shaped rods | staining/safety pin shaped rods | | |
| | □ gram negative rods | □ gram negative rods | | |
| | □ other | □ other | | |
| | | (/) | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |

| Test | Results of tests done on admission (//) | Abnormal test result at any time (specify date mm/dd/yy) |
|---------------------------------|---|--|
| | | |
| Respiratory secretions: | □ positive | □ positive |
| Bacterial culture | (specify) | (specify) |
| | □ negative | □ negative |
| | □ pending | □ pending |
| | □ not done | □ not done |
| | | (//) |
| Respiratory secretions: | □ positive | □ positive |
| Viral culture | (specify) | (specify) |
| | □ negative | □ negative |
| | □ pending | □ pending |
| | □ not done | □ not done |
| | | (//) |
| Respiratory secretions: | □ positive | □ positive |
| Influenza antigen | □ negative | □ negative |
| | □ pending | □ pending |
| | □ not done | □ not done |
| | | (/) |
| Respiratory secretions: | | |
| Other tests (DFA, PCR, etc.) | | (/) |
| Chest radiograph | □ normal | □ normal |
| | □ unilateral, lobar/consolidation | □ unilateral, lobar/consolidation |
| | □ bilateral, lobar/consolidation | ☐ bilateral, lobar/consolidation |
| | □ interstitial infiltrates | □ interstitial infiltrates |
| | □ widened mediastinum | □ widened mediastinum |
| | □ pleural effusion | □ pleural effusion |
| | □ other | □ other |
| | | (//) |
| Legionella urine antigen | □ positive | □ positive |
| | □ negative | □ negative |
| | □ pending | □ pending |
| | □ not done | □ not done |
| | | (//) |
| Other pertinent study results | | |
| (e.g., chest CT, pleural fluid) | | (/) |

| Test | Results of tests done on admission (//) | Abnormal test result at any time (specify date mm/dd/yy) |
|------|---|--|
| | | |

| INFECTIOUS DISEASE CONS | SULT: | □Yes | | No | □Unknown |
|---------------------------|----------------|---------------|-----------|----------|----------|
| Date:// | | | | | |
| Name of physician: | Last | | | Firs | t |
| | Telep | hone or bee | er numb | er () | |
| H0SPITAL TREATMENT: | | | | | |
| a. antibiotics | | | Yes | □No | □Unknown |
| If yes, check all that ap | ply: | | | | |
| ☐ Amoxicillin | | | | | |
| □ Ampicillin | | | | | |
| □ Ampicillin + sulbacta | ım (Una | syn) | | | |
| ☐ Augmentin (amoxicil | llin + cla | ıvulanate) | | | |
| ☐ Azithromycin (Zithro | max) | | | | |
| ☐ Cefazolin (Ancef, Ke | efzol) | | | | |
| ☐ Cefepime (Maxipime |)) | | | | |
| □ Cefixime (Suprax) | | | | | |
| □ Cefotetan (Cefotan) | | | | | |
| □ Cefotaxime (Clafora | n) | | | | |
| □ Cefoxitin (Mefoxin) | | | | | |
| □ Ceftazidime (Fortaz, | Tazice | f, Tazidime) | | | |
| ☐ Ceftizoxime (Cefizox | () | | | | |
| □ Ceftriaxone (Roceph | nin) | | | | |
| □ Cefuroxime (Ceftin) | | | | | |
| ☐ Cephalexin (Keflex, | Keftab) | | | | |
| ☐ Ciprofloxacin (Cipro) |) | | | | |
| ☐ Clarithromycin (Biax | in) | | | | |
| □ Doxycycline (Doryx, | Vibram | ycin) | | | |
| ☐ Erythromycin (E-Myd | cin, Ery- | -Tab, Eryc | | | |
| ☐ Gentamicin (Garamy | ycin) | | | | |
| □ Levofloxacin (Levaq | uin) | | | | |
| □ Nafcillin | | | | | |
| ☐ Ofloxacin (Floxin) | | | | | |
| □ Streptomycin | | | | | |
| □ Ticarcillin + clavulan | ate (Tin | nentin) | | | |
| ☐ Trimethaprim-sulfam | nethoxaz | zole (Bactrim | , Cotrim, | TMP/SMX) | |
| □ Vancomycin (Vanco | cin) | | | | |
| □ other | | | | | |
| b. antivirals | | | Yes | □No | □Unknown |

| If yes, check all that apply: | | | |
|---|----------------|-----|---------------------------------------|
| ☐ Acyclovir (Zovirax) | | | |
| ☐ Amantadine (Symmetrel) | | | |
| ☐ Oseltamivir (Tamiflu) | | | |
| ☐ Rimantidine (Flumadine) | | | |
| □ Zanamivir (Relenza) | | | |
| □ other | | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| Did notice the entire interest to access | □V | | |
| Did patient require intensive care? | □Yes | □No | □Unknown |
| If patient was admitted to Intensive Care Unit: | | | |
| a. Length of stay in ICU, in days: | _ | -N- | |
| b . Was patient on mechanical ventilation? | □Yes | □No | □Unknown |
| WORKING OR DISCHARGE DIAGNOSIS(ES) | | | |
| 1) | | | |
| 2) | | | |
| 3) | | | |
| | | | |
| OUTCOME: | | | |
| □Recovered/discharged | | | |
| □Died | | | |
| □Still in hospital: a) improving □ | b) worsening □ | | |
| □ Comment | | | |
| | | | |
| ADDITIONAL COMMENTS: | | | |
| ADDITIONAL COMMENTS: | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

Risk Exposure Questions

The following questions pertain to the 2 week period prior to the onset of your illness/symptoms:

| Occupation (pro | ovide | e info | rmation for all jo | bs/ volui | ıteer duti | es) | | |
|---|---------------|---------------------------|--|------------------------|---------------|--------------------|--|---|
| 1. Please briefly | y de | scribe | e your job/ volunte | eer duties | S: | | | |
| Yes N | lo | | contact with the | | | | | |
| Yes N | lo | Unl | our workplace hav k d approximate dat | | | | | |
| Knowledge of O | | | ersons beople with simila | r symnto | oms? Y | / N / Unk | | |
| • | | | nplete the following | | | , iv, oill | | |
| Name of ill person | | M/ F | Address | Phone number (s) | Date of onset | Relation to you | Did they seek medical care? Where? | Were they diagnosed by a physician? Describe. |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| 8. Have you trade Dates of Method of Where D | veled Trav | d any vel: _ ranspo | ing overnight (or last to where in the last to ortation for Traveltay? | wo week | s? Y / N | I / Unk | _ | al residence |

| Did Anyone Travel With You? If yes, specify: Are they ill with similar symptoms? Yes \(\sim \) No \(\sim \) Unk \(\sim \) Information for Additional Trips during the past two weeks: | If yes, specify: | |
|---|--|---|
| Are they ill with similar symptoms? Yes \square No \square Unk \square | Did Anyone Travel With You? | Yes \square No \square |
| | If yes, specify: | |
| nformation for Additional Trips during the past two weeks: | Are they ill with similar syr | mptoms? Yes \(\text{No} \(\text{Unk} \(\text{\pi} \) |
| | nformation for Additional Trips during the | ne past two weeks: |

Public Functions/Venues (during 2 weeks prior to symptom onset)

| Category | Yes/No/ Unknown (Y/N/U) | Description of Activity | Location of Activity | Date of Activity | Time of Activity (start, end) | Anyone else ill? (Y/N/U) |
|--|-------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 9. Sporting Event | | | | | | |
| 10. Performing Arts (ie Concert, Theater, Opera) | | | | | | |
| 11. Movie Theater | | | | | | |
| 12. Religious Gatherings | | | | | | |
| 13. Picnics | | | | | | |
| 14. Political Events (including Marches and Rallies) | | | | | | |
| 15. Meetings or Conferences (for work or personal interests) 16. Family Planning Clinics | | | | | | |
| 17. Government Office Building | | | | | | |
| 18. Airports | | | | | | |
| 19. Shopping Malls | | | | | | |
| 20. Gym/Workout Facilities | | | | | | |
| 21. Casinos | | | | | | |
| 22. Beaches | | | | | | |
| 23. Parks | | | | | | |
| 24. Parties (including Raves, Prom, etc) | | | | | | |
| 25. Bars/Clubs | | | | | | |
| 26. Tourist Attractions (ie Sea World, Zoo, Disneyland) | | | | | | |
| 27. Museums | | | | | | |
| 28. Street Fairs, Swap Meets, Flea Markets | | | | | | |
| 29. Carnivals/Circus | | | | | | |
| 30. Campgrounds | | | | | | |

Transportation

Have you used the following types of transportation in the 2 weeks prior to onset?

| 31. Bus Yes \square No \square Unk \square | | |
|---|--|----|
| Frequency of this type of transportation: Daily Weekly Origin: | | |
| Any connections? Yes \(\text{No} \(\text{Specify: Location} \) | Bus# | |
| Company Providing Transportation: Destination: | - | |
| 32. Train/Metro Yes □ No □ Unk □ | | |
| Frequency of this type of transportation: Daily Weekly | ☐ Occasionally ☐ Rarely | |
| Route Number: Origin: Origin: Origin: Destination: | Route # |) |
| 33. Airplane Yes □ No □ Unk □ | | |
| Frequency of this type of transportation: Daily Weekly Flight Number: Origin: | - | |
| Any connections? Yes No (Specify: Location Company Providing Transportation: Destination: | Flight # | _) |
| 34. Boat/Ferry Yes □ No □ Unk □ | | |
| Frequency of this type of transportation: Daily Weekly Ferry Number: Origin: | | |
| Any connections? Yes No (Specify: Location) Company Providing Transportation: Destination: | Ferry # |) |
| 35. Van Pool/Shuttle Yes □ No □ Unk □ | | |
| Frequency of this type of transportation: Daily Weekly Route Number: Origin: | , and the second | |
| Any connections? Yes No (Specify: Location Company Providing Transporation: Destination: | Route # | _) |

Food & Beverage

| _ | , , | ou eat at any of the following <i>foo r beverages</i> ? (If "yes", circle esta | |
|---|--|---|---|
| Restaurant, fast-food or de Cafeteria at school, hospit Concert, movie, other ente Sporting event or snack ba Outdoor farmers market o Dinner party, barbecue or Birthday party or other ce | tal, other Y/N/Unk ertainment Y/N/Unk ar Y/N/Unk or swap meetY/N/Unk potluck Y/N/Unk | Plane, boat, train, other Gas station or 24-hr store Street-vended food Beach, park or outdoor event Other food establishment | Y / N / Unk Y / N / Unk Y / N / Unk Y / N / Unk Y / N / Unk Y / N / Unk Y / N / Unk Y / N / Unk |
| If "YES" for any in questi Date/Time: Food/drink consumed: Others also ill?: Y / N | ion #36, provide date, ti Location: | me, location and list of food item | s consumed: |
| If "YES" for any in questi Date/Time: Food/drink consumed: Others also ill?: Y / N | ion #36, provide date, ti Location: Unk (explain): | me, location and list of food item | s consumed: |
| Date/Time: | Location: | me, location and list of food item | |
| Date/Time:Food/drink consumed: | Location: | me, location and list of food item | |
| 37. During the 2 weeks from? | before your illness, did | you consume any free <i>food samp</i> | les |
| Grocery store Race/competition Public gathering? Private gathering? | | | |
| | Location (Na | me, location and list of food item me and Address): | |

| If " | YES" for any in question | #34, provide d | late, time, location a | nd list of food items | s consumed: |
|----------|--|------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|
| | Date/Time: | Location | on (Name and Addre | ess): | |
| | Food/drink consumed: | | | | |
| | Food/drink consumed:Others also ill?: Y / N / U | Jnk (explain): | | | |
| 38. | During the 2 weeks bef | ore your illnes | s, did you consume | any of the following | g <i>products</i> ? |
| | Vitamins | Y / N / Unk | Specify (Include B | Brand Name): | |
| | Herbal remedies | Y/N/Unk | Specify (Include B | Brand Name): | |
| | Herbal remedies Diet Aids | Y/N/Unk | Specify (Include B | Brand Name): | |
| | Nutritional Supplements | Y / N / Unk | Specify (Include B | Brand Name): | |
| | Other Ingested non-food | Y/N/Unk | Specify (Include B | Brand Name): | |
| | During the 2 weeks beformilk, cheese, fruit juices) Date/Time: Others also ill?: Y / N / U | ? Location | Y/N/Unk If y (Name and Addres | es, specify name of s): | `item: |
| | During the 2 weeks before | re your illness, | did you purchase fo | ood from any interne | et grocers? |
| | If yes, specify date / time Items purchased: | of delivery: | | Store/Site: | |
| 41. | During the 2 weeks before If yes, specify date/time of Items purchased: | of delivery: | Store | purchased from: | |
| | Please check the routine s Community or Municipal Bottled water (Specify Br | □ Well (s | shared) \square W | Vell (private family) |) |
| Aeı | rosolized water | | | | |
| | During the 2 weeks prior check all that apply): | to illness, did y | ou consume water f | rom any of the follo | owing sources |
| | Wells □ Lakes □ | Streams | ☐ Springs ☐ Por | nds Creeks | \square Rivers |
| | Sewage-contaminated wat | er | | | |
| | Street-vended beverages (1 | Prepared with water an | nd sold by street vendors) | | |
| \Box I | ce prepared w/ unfiltered | | | unicipal water supply or that i | s not bottled or |
| boile | Jnpasteurized milk | | | | |
| | Other (Specify: | | |) | |
| (| Juici (Specify | | | <i>_</i> | |

| If "YES" for any in question #43, provide date, time, location and type of water consumed: |
|---|
| Type of water consumed: |
| Date/Time: Location (Name and Address): Type of water consumed: Others also ill?: Y / N / Unk (explain): |
| 44. During the 2 weeks prior to illness, did you engage in any of the following recreational activities (check all that apply): |
| □ Swimming in public pools (e.g., community, municipal, hotel, motel, club, etc) □ Swimming in kiddie/wading pools □ Swimming in sewage-contaminated water □ Swimming in fresh water, lakes, ponds, creeks, rivers, springs, sea, ocean, bay (please circle) |
| □ Wave pools □ Rafting □ Boating □ Hot tubs (non-private) □ Other (Specify: |
| If "YES" for any in question #44, provide date, time, location and type of activity: |
| Date/Time: Location (Name and Address): |
| Type of water consumed: |
| Others also ill?: Y / N / Unk (explain): |
| If "YES" for any in question #44, provide date, time, location and type of activity: |
| Date/Time: Location (Name and Address): |
| Type of water consumed: |
| Type of water consumed: Others also ill?: Y / N / Unk (explain): |
| |
| 45. During the 2 weeks prior to illness, were you exposed to aerosolized water from any of the following sources (check all that apply): |
| ☐ Air conditioning at public places ☐ Respiratory devices* ☐ Vaporizers* ☐ Humidifiers* ☐ Misters* ☐ Whirlpool spas* ☐ Hot tubs* ☐ Spa baths* ☐ Creek and ponds ☐ Decorative fountains* ☐ Other (please explain) |
| * Non-private (i.e., used at hospitals, spas, salons, etc.) |
| If "YES" for any in question #45, provide date, time, and location of exposure to aerosolized water: |
| Date/Time: Location (Name and Address): |
| Explanation of aerosolized water: |
| Others also ill: Y / N / Unk (explain): |

| | If "YES" for any in question #45, provide date, time, and location of exposure to aerosolized water: |
|-----|--|
| | Date/Time: Location (Name and Address): |
| | Explanation of aerosolized water: Others also ill: Y / N / Unk (explain): |
| Red | creation* |
| *Re | ecreation is defined as non-work related activities |
| 46. | In the past two weeks, did you participate in any outdoor activities? Y/N/Unk (If "yes", list all and provide location) |
| 47. | Do you recall any insect or tick bites during these outdoor activities? Y / N / Unk (If "yes", list all and provide location) |
| | Did you participate in other indoor recreational activities (i.e. clubs, crafts, etc that do not occur in a private home)? Y / N / Unk (List all and provide location) |
| Ved | ctors |
| | Do you recall any insect or tick bites in the last 2 weeks? $Y / N / Unk$ |
| Oth | Date(s) of bite(s): Bitten by \(\triangle \text{Mosquito} \) \(\triangle \text{Tick} \(\triangle \text{Flea} \) \(\triangle Fl |
| | Have you had any contact with wild or domestic animals, including pets? Y / N / Unk be of Animal: Explain nature of contact: |
| | Is / was the animal ill recently: Y / N / Unk Symptoms: Date / Time of contact: Location of contact: |
| | To your knowledge, have you been exposed to rodents/rodent droppings in the last 2 weeks? Y / N / Unk If yes, explain type of exposure: Date/Time of exposure: Location where exposure occurred: |